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A. I. Oshirov (c. 1901-1931):
A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia
Christopher Atwood
In the history of the Asian revolutionary movement, the term
"Comintern representative" has come to have an unpleasant ring.^ In
the language of the opponents of this revolution, these representatives,
or "agents," were seen as the diabolic instigators of strife and anarchy
who incited humble and peaceful workers and peasants to make
destructive and nihilistic rebellion.^ Even in the historiography of the
Asian revolutionaries themselves, the term Comintern representative
has come to have a bad odor; whether in China, or Vietnam, or Korea,
they are seen as ignorant dogmatists, doing incalculable harm to the
revolution with their mechanical application of Soviet theories. Even
more damaging, they are subject to the implicit accusation of not acting
in good faith, putting Russia's imperial interests ahead of those of the
colonialized peoples of Asia.^ Even in Mongolia, where the Soviet

^ I would like to thank Ochiryn Namsraijaw (Ina I. Oshirova) for her
invaluable aid in supplying information about her brother Aleksandr. Inter
views were conducted with her in Mongolian on April 3 and May 13, 1992, in
Ulaanbaatar, where she lives in retirement. Without her help, this article
could not have been written. Gyorgy Kara and Elizabeth Constantine read
drafts of this paper and contributed important and helpful suggestions and
corrections. Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from
the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided
by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information
Agency, and the United States Department of State, which administers the
Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research Program (Title VIII).
2 See, for example, Sulian yinmou wenzheng hiiibian ["Compilation
of documentation on Soviet plots"] (Beijing, 1928; reprint Taipei, 1987), vols.
1-7 (vs. 402-408). One chapter of this compilation of translated documents
seized from the Soviet embassy in April, 1927, is titled Mi tan lei, or "About
agents."
^ See, for example. Sun Wuxia, Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo
geming guanxi shigang (Zhengzhou, 1988). The classic example of this trend
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influence was pervasive up until the fall of the Communist system and
where the Comintern was hence still held to be infallible, the new
post-Communist historiography has in rapid order recapitulated the
nationalist critiques voiced long before in China, North Korea and
Vietnam.'^ All that was popular, good, and effective in the Mongolian
revolution and the ensuing socialist regime is ascribed to the genius of
native Mongolian revolutionaries, while all the cruelties and repressions
are heaped upon the head of the Soviet Union and its Comintern
agents. This approach gives a comforting resolution to the fundamental
problem of Mongolian national identity—the lack of any past that is
modem and yet not Communist. If all the good was done by the Mon
golians and all the evil by the foreigners, then the ruling Mongolian
People's Revolutionary Party was in essence a good party and its past a
proud one.
The Communist International was a fundamental factor in the
formation and development of virtually all the Asian revolutionary
parties. Thus, despite the accusations directed against the organization,
it is a futile enterprise to dream of what these parties might have been
like had not Soviet influence "distorted" their development. Nor can
the stereotype of dogmatic foreign-based bumblers and native
revolutionary geniuses, so comforting both to American journalists like
Harrison Salisbury hoping to "play the China card," as well as to Asian
Communist parties in a post-Soviet era, be accepted without question.^

in Western historiography is Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and
the Rise ofMao (New York, 1967).
^ For the old view, seeMAKhN Msch khogjikhdd olon ulsyn kommunist kh6d6lg06nii tuslamjiin roli, ach kholbogdol (Ulaanbaatar, 1978), and

Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Nam ba olon ulsyn kommunist khOdOlgOdn:
barimt, material (Ulaanbaatar, 1979). The new view is found, with a wealth
of original documentation from the security archives of Mongolia, in S. Battogtokh, Nuuts khuiwaldaanaas nugalaa zawkhrald (Ulaanbaatar, 1991).
^ Richard C. Thornton, in The Comintern and the Chinese Commu
nists, 1928-1931 (Seattle, 1969), long ago delivered a powerful critique of
Benjamin Schwartz’s thesis that Maoism represented a struggle of the correct
native line against obviously wrong-headed ideas imposed by ignorant Soviet
communists and their Chinese acolytes. Shum Kui-kwong, in The Chinese

Communists ’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front,
1935-1945 (Hong Kong, 1988), has done the same for the Maoist
historiography of the second United Front period.
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One reason this simplification has gone unchallenged for so long
is that even the leading personalities of the Comintern lived their lives
in secrecy and died in obscurity, often in the camps of the Soviet Gulag,
while those who have later criticized them had all the apparatus of the
state in their hands to spread their views.
To this date, few
monographic studies of the notorious "Comintern agents" have
appeared.^
A study of the life of one such representative, A.I. Oshirov (c.
1901-1931), a Buriat Mongol who was assigned to the People's
Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (1924-1946), demonstrates the
inadequacy of the view that such representatives either always repre
sented the interests of the Soviet Union over those of the local parties
to which they were assigned, or that they were always bumblers
demanding that everything be done exactly the way Lenin had done it in
October. It also shows that these representatives were far from being
pure instruments of the international Communist apparatus, with no
thoughts other than those their programmers had instilled in them.
Oshirov's background among the Buriats of Russian Siberia was a
uniquely appropriate one for his work among the Mongols of China's
Inner Mongolia. Yet if his work there had any fault it was in giving too
much support to the local Inner Mongol party leadership and in not
exercising enough his function of guidance and leadership. For this
fault he was replaced, in 1927.
Yet contrary to the received view of the Comintern, the changes
made by his replacement. M l. Amagaev, were not destructive, nor
were they imposed on the party by force. What did almost destroy the
party in 1928 was a series of ill-considered uprisings which were spon
sored as much, if not more, by young hotheads in the party as by the
advice of the Comintern. When Oshirov returned to Inner Mongolia
after an absence of several years it was to implement another change of
line, this time one that pushed the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries into
close union with the Chinese Communist Party. Again, contrary to
received opinion, this change was not unwelcome to substantial parts of

^ See the comments in Branko Lazitch, with Milorad M.
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern (Stanford, 1973),
v-xiii.
Mikhail Markovich Borodin seems to be the only Comintern
representative in Asia to have received a full scale biography in English—see
Dan N. Jacobs, Borodin: Stalin's Man in China (Cambridge, 1981).
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the Inner Mongolian party movement, although it was rejected by
others.
Oshirov played no part in its implementation, however. He was
captured just after crossing the border in 1931 and executed by local
Inner Mongolian border guards. He thus participated in virtually the
whole first stage in the history of the People's Revolutionary Party of
Inner Mongolia. His death coincided with its eclipse, as one part
merged with the Chinese Communists, one part gradually lost touch
with the party center, while others to the east were reduced to being
impotent conspirators working underground in the new Japan
ese-sponsored Inner Mongolian autonomous governments. His in
volvement offers a glimpse into how the implementation of the
Communist International’s policies towards local parties was mediated
by individuals who unavoidably brought their own personal histories
into play.

Oshirov’s Background Among the Buriat Mongols (1901-1924)
Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov was born among the Buriats of
Russia. The Buriats were Mongols who had been incorporated into the
Russian Empire in the seventeenth century and had undergone a more
or less profound process of cultural change and adaptation. Up
through World War II, however, most continued to preserve their
language and traditional religion, be it shamanism or Buddhism."^ The
Buriats of the Ekhirit, Bulagat, and Alair clans, who lived west of Lake
Baikal, were subject to a greater pressure from Russian immigration,
which by the early twentieth century led to profound changes in their
originally pastoral nomadic way of life.^ In addition, these western
Buriats, unlike the southern (Selenge, Tsongol, and Sartuul) and east
ern (Khori, Barguzhin, Aga) Buriats did not adopt Buddhism, and had
relatively low literacy in the Mongol script. Thus Russian high culture,
in the form of Russian as a written language and the Christian religion.
^ On the Buriats, see James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of

Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge, 1992); Caro
line Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Economy Society and Religion in a
Siberian Collective Farm (Cambridge, 1983), “Buriats” in Graham Smith,
The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London, 1990), 290-303.

^ Caroline Humphrey, "The uses of genealogy: A historical study of

the nomadic and sedentarized Buryat," in Pastoral Production and Society
(Cambridge, 1979), 235-260.

48

Christopher A twood

also spread more widely among them than it did to the south or east of
Lake Baikal. Yet all through the Buriat lands, the nineteenth century
saw the emergence of a Buriat intelligentsia that placed the dual
question of identity and progress, especially as this identity related to
Buriat religion, at center stage.^
The childhood of A. I. Oshirov well illustrates the cultural trends
among the Buriats in the first quarter of the twentieth century.
He
was bom among the Alair Buriats living west of the Baikal, in a village
called Togot (Mongolian Tost, Buriat Tohoto), near the present day
town of Kunulik, on the Trans-Siberian railway. Although the village
was purely Buriat, Aleksandr’s father, Ivan Anatol’evich Oshirov, was
actually not a pure Buriat, but the son of Anatol Szczeglowski, a Pole
exiled to Siberia for his participation in the Polish uprising of 1863.
Szczeglowski married a Buriat woman, but both he and his wife died
soon after the birth of Ivan, their only son. Left an orphan and desti
tute, Ivan was taken in by the family of one of his wife's relatives, a
wealthy but childless shamaness {udgan). She died soon afterwards,
and Ivan was able to claim her property as his own. Rumor had it that
he had in fact killed her by using her own shamanic magic. Sheep’s
milk sliced with a knife in a special way and fed to an old person will
supposedly kill him or her.
However that may be, Ivan turned the property he inherited
from the old shamaness into a flourishing estate. He married a Buriat
woman, Agafiia Vladimirovna, from the village Moilt about twelve
kilometers from Togot. Agafiia was of the Tarkhai clan who had the
title of shiilenge or gentry. Up to the revolution, this title was pre
served on a leather diploma dating from the mid-seventeenth century.
^ On the revival in general, see Robert Rupen, “The Buryat Intelli
gentsia” Far Postern Quarterly XV (1956), 383-398. On specific figures, see
Dorji Banzarov, trans. Jan Nattier and John R. Krueger, “The Black Faith or
Shamanism among the Mongols,'' Mongolian Studies VII (1981-2), 53-91,
Robert Rupen, “Cyben Zamcaranovic Zamcarano,” Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies, 19 (1956), 126-145; Thubten J. Norbu and Dan Martin,
Dorjiev: Memoirs of a Tibetan Diplomat. (Hoka Bunka Kenkyu no. 17,
1992). On the dynamic of identity and progress (or “essentialism” and
“epochalism”) among developing and colonialized peoples, see Clifford
Geertz’s essay “After the Revolution; The Fate of Nationalism in the New
States” in his The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 234-254.
The information on the childhood of A.I. Oshirov is derived from
interviews with his younger sister Ochiryn Namsraijaw.
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before Mongolia’s division between the Manchu and Russian empires.
Ivan's specialty was raising horses of the Orlov breed, for which he
received a medal from the local government.
The family also raised
many other types of livestock. They also kept bees, and Ivan would
supplement their diet with game shot in the forests. His youngest
daughter (Ina, later Namsraijaw) remembered a childhood of abun
dance and plenty, with fresh milk and cream available regularly. Ivan
was a respected member of the community as well, being accepted into
the Fourteenth Branch of the Khonggodor clan of his mother and his
shamaness guardian. (His Russo-Buriat surname, Oshirov, also came
from his mother's relatives.) Thus Ivan's social position combined an
honored role within the local Buriat society with a prosperity that
brought recognition from Russian society as well. His pale skin and
large nose, inherited from his father, may have also helped him win
recognition in a Siberian society in which anti-Asian racism was
becoming stronger. ^2
The Oshirov family were typical examples of the characteristi
cally Buriat (but rapidly evolving) culture in the valley of the Angara
River. Previously, the inhabitants of the Togot village had practiced
trans-humance, moving between a summer and a winter camp, but the
local Buriats felt that their traditional summer pastures had been ruined
by the Trans-Siberian railway which was laid in this region around
1893-5.1^ In the same period, coal mines were also opened at
Cheremkhovo (about 25 km down the line to the south-east). As a
result, the Khonggodor clan settled down permanently in the Togot
village, the old winter camp.
The Oshirov family lived in a sort of permanent yurt; it had a
traditional lattice-work 3oirt frame, but it was covered by wood, not
felt. The mother of the family, Agafiia Vladimirovna, was a Christian
—her whole village of Moilt had been baptized in the nearby river by the
See Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third
Edition, vol. 18 (New York, 1974), under “Orlov Trotter,” 561.
Forsyth, History of the Peoples of Siberia, 220-223. Serge Wolff,
who met Ivan’s eldest daughter and her husband in Germany, received from
them the impression that Ivan was a Russian man: "Mongol Delegations in
Western Europe, 1925-1929," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 32
(1945), 292
Stephen G. Marks, Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad
and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917 (Ithaca, 1991), 171-2,
179-180.
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local Orthodox priests. Thus all the children had Christian names and
an icon of St. Nicholas was hung on the wall. Ivan, however, stuck to
the shamanism of his maternal ancestors and St. Nicholas had to share
the wall with his ongods, or dolls that were home for the spirits of the
clan ancestors, especially shamans. Only shortly before his death, in
1926 did he abandon shamanism. By that time, however, the dominant
role that Orthodox Christianity had played in his youth was a thing of
the past. Ivan converted to Buddhism; he held a great feast and then
"saw off' his ongods (pngodyg khariulakh), by taking them off into the
forest and burning them. In the few months before his death, a table
with the White Tara (Tsagaan Dari Ekh), a Buddhist goddess favored
as a protectress by the Mongols, occupied the place of honor in the
yurt.
For Ivan and Agafiia's children, at least nine of whom survived
to adulthood, education was largely in the Russian style. The whole
family did know the Mongol script, but the children also knew Rus
sian. * 4 Grigorii, the eldest, was an avid reader—his favorite reading
was the Brockhaus-Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary (Enisiklopedicheskii slovar' Brokgauz i Efron), which his father had at home.^^
Through this encyclopedia, Grigorii began to acquire a different
cultural perspective; he made a hobby of growing tomatoes and carrots
in a garden, but the Oshirov family retained the traditional Mongol
disdain for vegetables and refused them. Once when a villager went
insane, Grigorii was able to diagnose his illness using the concepts he
had learned from the encyclopedia.
When the Russian revolution broke out, it was natural that Ivan
Anatol'evich, as a wealthy farmer-rancher and the son-in-law of a minor
Buriat gentry family, would support the privileged against the rebellious
Bolsheviks. He supplied the troops of General Kappel', commander of
Kolchak’s Second Army with food and mounts, and Agafiia
Vladimirovna was proud to recall that Kappel', whom she considered a
gracious and well-educated man, had once dined at their house. This

The only personal letter I have seen that was written in Mongolian
by A.I. Oshirov was dictated to an Inner Mongolian associate. From Oshirov’s Mongolian signature on it, he does not seem to have used Mongolian as
an everyday written language.
The Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’was published in St. Petersburg in
82 volumes, from 1890 to 1904. The publication was a joint effort between
F.A. Brockhaus in Leipzig and I.A. Efron in St.Petersburg.
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must have happened during Kappel's epic retreat in January, 1920, and
demanded considerable courage on the part of the Oshirovs, as the end
of the White regime was by then clearly in sight. Ivan Oshirov even
allowed White detachments to store grenades in their house. With the
collapse of the Kolchak regime in November, 1919-January, 1920,
many friends and relatives who had fought for the Whites fled to China
and Kholon Buir.
We know that Aleksandr Ivanovich did not follow in his par
ents’ path and in the end joined the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately, there is
no evidence on exactly how this happened. When the revolution broke
out, Aleksandr, then about sixteen years old, was attending a
non-classical high school {reaVnye uchilishchd) in Irkutsk. The Bol
sheviks took power in Irkutsk on January 8, 1918. From the beginning,
though, Siberia was hostile to Bolshevik sectarianism. Through his
schoolmates, Oshirov had became involved in student political activity
but he, too, was not a Bolshevik.
Thus, when a coalition of
non-Bolshevik parties, spearheaded by iunkers (cadets in military high
school), staged a rebellion against the ruling party in July, Oshirov
supported them.^^ There is no sign that he was active during the
ensuing civil war (1918-1920 in Buriatia)-it must not be forgotten that
he was still under twenty at the time.^^ Yet his youthful support for
the iunker rebellion placed him in great danger of being taken auto
matically for an anti-Bolshevik, should the Bolsheviks return.
The first Soviet government in Siberia was overthrown by for
eign intervention in June-August, 1918. From that point forward, a
partisan movement had operated at a low level among Siberia's peas
ants. By September, 1919, the arbitrary exactions of the White regime
and its Allied supporters had caused this movement to mushroom.
Beginning in November 1919, partisans were active in the Alair and
other Buriat regions west of the Baikal, but there is no evidence that

See Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of the Third
Edition, vol. 21 (New York, 1975), under "realschule," 528, and vol. 30
(1982), under "iunker," 448. Irkutsk had both a Iunker school and a
preparatory school for the Siberian cadets corps--see Entsiklopedicheskii
slovar’vol. 25 (St. Petersburg, 1894), under "Irkutsk."
On the Russian revolution in Buryatia, see Russel E. Snow, "The
Russian Revolution of 1917-18 in Transbaikalia," Soviet Studies 23 (1971-2),
201-215, and The Bolsheviks in Siberia, 1917-1918 (London, 1977).

52

Christopher A twood

A.I. Oshirov was involved with them.l* As the Kolchak regime disin
tegrated and the Red Army advanced from the west, Mensheviks,
Social Revolutionaries, and some Bolsheviks created a leading organ,
called the Political Center, to demand an end to the White regime.
From December 19, 1919, onwards, regiments under the Center’s con
trol began to openly seize power in town after town in Central Siberia.
The Political Center finally came to power in Irkutsk on January 5,
1920 and executed Admiral Kolchak on Febrary 7, 1920. The Political
Center hoped to establish a buffer region between the Soviet gov
ernment to the west and the Japanese occupied area to the east, but
within a few weeks Bolshevik elements in Irkutsk had, supported by the
advancing Red Army, dispersed the Political Center and brought the
Soviet republic's borders to the shores of Lake Baikal. The buffer plan
was, however, put into effect east of the Baikal, where the Far Eastern
Republic was formed. Its leadership was, behind the scenes, securely in
Communist hands.
At first, the local Bolsheviks and their Buriat supporters
declared that under the Soviet regime, the Buriats "have no need of any
autonomy whatsoever." From Moscow, however, Lenin intervened in
January, 1921, to create a Central Committee of the Buriat-Mongols of
East Siberia. For almost a year, he was unable to secure the formation
of a definite Buriat autonomous area. The creation of a Buriat-Mongol
Autonomous Region in the Far Eastern Republic, however, pushed the
Irkutsk government to create its own Mongol-Buriat [sic] Autonomous
Region on January 9, 1922. Although the territory, a non-contiguous
patchwork of five districts (aimag), was 70% Buriat, only about 100 of
the grand total of 353 Communist Party members were Buriat.^9 It
was in this context that many figures who might otherwise have been
treated with disdain were allowed into the party and government, and
among them was Oshirov.
G.D. Basaev and S.I. Erbanova, MAi Erbanov (Ulan-Ude, 1989),
39-40. On the partisans in Siberia, see David Footman, "Siberian partisans in
the Civil War," Soviet Affairs 1 (1956), 24-53.
^ ^ On the Civil War in Buriatia and the restoration of the Communist
regime there, see Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923
(New York, 1951), 350-363 and Paul Dotsenko, The Struggle for Democracy
in Siberia, J97 7-7920 (Stanford, 1983), 110-120.
29 Boris Chichlo, “Histoire de la formation des territoires autonomes
chez les peuples turco-mongols de la Siberie,” Cahiers du monde russe et
sovietique 28 (1987), 362-401, and especially, 367-371.
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In December, 1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the
Buri^t-Mongol Autonomous Regional, A.I. Oshirov was elected to the
fourteen-man Regional Executive Committee (oblispolkom) of the
Russian Republic’s Mongol-Buriat region.21 With the final withdrawal
of the Japanese from the Siberian mainland, and the merger of the Far
Eastern Republic with the Russian Republic in October 1922, the two
republics' autonomous regions were merged and elevated to form the
Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSR) as
proclaimed on May 22, 1923. As an Autonomous Republic, this new
state had a Soviet (or Council) of People's Commissars, just as did the
Soviet Union as a whole. Here A.I. Oshirov, barely in his twenties,
served as People's Commissar of Agriculture.22

The Soviet Union & Inner Mongolia: Forming a Policy
(1924-1927)
The Soviet Union and China established diplomatic relations in
May, 1924.
The new ambassador. Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan
(1889-1937), quickly began to set up the apparatus to implement the
Soviet Union's two-fold policy: regular diplomatic relations through
formal embassy personnel, and clandestine contacts with various dissi
dent forces in China, carried on both by the Communist International
and the Soviet military advisers.2^ Oshirov was chosen to play a role in
this second, highly sensitive, aspect of Soviet policy. From the
beginning, both the Buriat Mongols and Russian Siberian Communist
organization played an important role in the formation of the USSR's
Asian policy. The Communist International's Secretariat for the Far
East, formed in 1921, was chaired by Boris Zakharovich Shumiatskii
(1886-1943), the Communist Party boss of Siberia.24 It also included
the red-haired Grigorii Naumovich Voitinskii (1893-1953) and his wife
Mariia Kuznetsova. In spring, 1920, Voitinskii had undertaken one of
the first Soviet Communist missions to China and from November,

Basaev and Erbanova, M.N. Erbanov, 66-67.
22 Interview with Ochiryn Namsraijaw, April 3 and May 13, 1992.
22 See his biography, V.V. Sokolov, Na boevykh postakh diplomaticheskogo fronta: zhizn' i deiatel ’nost ’ L.M. Karakhana (Moscow,
1983).
24 See Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the
Comintern, under "Shumiatsky, Boris Zakharovich" and S. Demberel, Nert
Khuwisgalch B.Z. Shumyatskii {\]\azinh<xaia.v, 1975).
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1923, to July, 1927, he was the senior representative of the Comintern
in China.^^ Another member of the Far Eastern Secretariat was Mikhei
Nikolaevich Erbanov (1889-1938), who was Oshirov's superior, both
as the chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of the RSFSR's
Mongol-Buriat Autonomous Region, and as the Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars in the BMASSR.^^ Erbanov quite
possibly brought Oshirov to the attention of the Secretariat as a
potential representative.
From its very inception, the Buriat-Mongol Republic was
closely linked to the Soviet Union's hopes for influence in the east.^7
The Russian People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had strongly
advocated raising Buriat autonomy from the provincial to the
autonomous republic level precisely in order to demonstrate to the
Asian peoples the uniqueness of Soviet Russia's minority policy.^* At
the same time, the Siberian organization was likewise closely involved.
In July, 1920, an Oriental Political Bureau was created under B.Z.
Shumiatskii's Siberian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party’s
Central Committee. The Bureau was organized into four departments:
Mongolian-Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. It primarily dealt
with the peoples of those nationalities who lived in Siberia, although its
propaganda was meant to have wider influence.
The Mongol
ian-Tibetan Department was particularly active in promoting the
development of the Mongolian People's Party of Outer Mongolia into a
significant force in winter 1920-1921, organizing Buriats like
El’bekdorzhi R. Rinchino and Tsyben Zh. Zhamtsarano to join the
party. The Department also published the newspaper Monggol-un
linen ("Mongolia's Truth"), in Mongolian.
See Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the
Comintern, under "Voitinski, Grigori" and Janies Pinckney Harrison, The
Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party,
7927-7972 (New York, 1972), 27-30, 55, 67-8, 100-101, 120.
See the photograph in Basaev and Erbanova, M.N. Erbanov, plate
3.
The following discussion of the Comintern’s relations with East
Asia and Mongolia derives, apart from the sources mentioned, from an
interview conducted in April, 1992, with Dr. Sanjiin Damdinsiiren
(Ulaanbaatar) who has worked extensively in Comintern and MPRP archives.
1 would like to record here my thanks to him.
2^ Chichlo, "Histoire de la formatiog des territoires autonomes . . ."
Cahiers du monde russes et sovietiques 28 (1987), 370.
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In June 1921, the Communist International set up its own
Secretariat for the Far East. At that time, the Mongolian-Tibetan
Committee was transferred to the Comintern, which was the regular
channel for international revolutionaiy activity. In fact, though, since
the Secretariat was headed by B.Z. Shumiatskii, the difference between
the old set-up (under the Siberian Bureau) and the new one (under the
Comintern's Secretariat for the Far East) was nominal. After April,
when the People's Army led by the Mongolian People's Party built a
base in Mongolia, the Mongolian Tibetan Department and its
Monggol-un Unen lapsed, being replaced by direct ties between Mon
golia and the Comintern. Many Buriats, of whom E.R. Rinchino and
Ts. Zh. Zhamtsarano were only the most prominent, moved south to
Mongolia in the wake of the Mongolian People's Party's victory. Most
of these initial Buriat advisers were suspect characters in their own
homeland, former Social Revolutionaries under a cloud for previous
nationalist and anti-Bolshevik activity. Rather than simply liquidating
them, however, the Russian Communists encouraged them to go south
and work to develop Mongolia along revolutionary lines.
The Comintern's Secretariat for the Far East was abolished
early in 1922, and replaced by the Eastern Department, which was
under the Comintern's general Secretariat. Shumiatskii, who was being
ap-pointed as ambassador to Persia, was replaced as head of the new
organ by a hotblooded revolutionary romantic, Fedor Fedorovich
Raskolnikov (alias Petrov, 1892-1939).In 1924, in the wake of the
controversy surrounding the execution of S. Danzan, the Comintern's
links to the Mongolian People's Party were strengthened. The People's
Party was officially admitted as a candidate member of the Comintern,
with deliberative rights in its Congresses. In August 1924, the Kazak
Bolshevik Turar Ryskulovich Ryskulov (alias Khasagbai/Kazakbay,

Robert Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, vol. 1
(Bloomington, 1964), 201-203, 239. Of course Zhamtsarano and other
Buriats had been active in Mongolia during its first period of independ
ence/autonomy (1911-1919) as well.
See biographical notes in Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical
Dictionary of the Comintern, under "Raskolnikov, Feodor F." and the sketch
in Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie, trans. C.I.P. Ferdinand and D.M.
Bellos, Makers of the Russian Revolution: Biographies of Bolshevik Leaders
(London, 1974), 202-208.
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1894-193 8),was assigned as the first representative; in summer,
1925, he was replaced by Matvei Innokent’evich Amagaev
(1897-1937), a Buriat Bolshevik who had earlier been a member of the
Central Committee of Buriat-Mongols of Eastern Siberia and chairman
of the Far Eastern Republic's Buriat Region, then a member of the
Presidium of the BMASSR's Communist Party Committee.32 These
appointments mark the eclipse of Social-Revolutionaries, nationalists,
and other politically unreliable persons in the Comintern's Mongolian
operations and their replacement by Bolsheviks, albeit ones often of
non-ethnic Russian origin. At the same time, a Mongolian Com
mission was organized in the Far Eastern Department to serve as a kind
of think-tank for the Comintern's Mongolian policy. Ryskulov and
Amagaev were made members, as was Moscow's first consul in
Mongolia, A.N. Vasil'ev, and Nikolai Bukharin in Moscow.33
Raskolnikov's Eastern Department also served as the
Comintern's main supervisor for policy towards East Asia (China,
Korea, and Japan) as well as Indochina and the Dutch Indies. From
1923 on, the East Asian operation seems to have been under the
supervision of Grigorii Voitinskii, then living in Shanghai. As a result,
perhaps, of the wide range of tasks for which Voitinskii was responsi
ble and the difficulty of maintaining underground communications, he
was able to exercise only a loose coordinating role between the various
party organizations in each area. In the Guomindang’s southern base,
he tended to be eclipsed by the Comintern/Russian Communist Party
representative, Mikhail M. Borodin, and in Beijing by the Soviet
ambassador Lev M. Karakhan.34 In Inner Mongolia, the earliest links
to native revolutionaries were undertaken by El’bekdorzhi Rinchino.
As the Communist International became aware of the revolutionary
possibilities in Inner Mongolia in the spring and summer of 1925, it
came to view the Inner Mongolian revolution primarily as part of the
See the biographical notes in Aleksandre A. Bennigsen and S.
Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A
Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago, 1979), 205-6.
See his biography, N.P. Egunov, M.l. Amagaev (Ulan-Ude, 1974).
Biographical notes on A.N. Vasil’ev in Mongol Ardyn Namyn
Gurawdugaar Ikh Khural: 1924 ony naim-yesdiigeer sar: delgerengiii
temdeglel (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), 258. On the Commission and Bukharin’s
views therein, see O. Batsaikhan, "Mongol owogtny negdekhiig eserguiitsekh,"
II Towchoo (Ulaanbaatar), no. 7 (40), March 1-10, 1992.
Harrison, Long March to Power, 67.
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Chinese revolution. Thus it was also put under Voitinskii's general
supervision. In line with this policy, Ryskulov and Amagaev repeatedly
asked the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (as the People's
Party was renamed in spring, 1925) to refrain from making direct
contact with the Inner Mongols and instead to channel all such contact
through the Communist International.
In 1924, young, politically active Inner Mongols were all
responding to the Mongolian revolution of 1921.^^ In 1922, one
group, based in the rich steppes of Kholdn Buir, in the northeast corner
of Inner Mongolia, had organized an Eastern Border People's Party
(Doronadu Khijagar-un Arad-im Nam, also known by its unofficial
name as the Kholdn Buir Youth Party). Led by a Daur Mongol, Merse,
this weakly organized group enjoyed the exclusive patronage of the
Mongolian People's Party for two years (1922-1924). El'bekdorzhi R.
Rinchino, the powerful Buriat in the Mongolian People's Party, was
their main supporter.
Another group of Mongols, mostly in their thirties and forties
and from more Chinese influenced areas of Chakhar and Eastern Inner
Mongolia, were members of the Chinese Guomindang. In 1923, they
allied with Merse and began creating their own Inner Mongolian
revolutionary organization. In April 1924, a Kharachin Mongol, Serengdonrub, went to independent Mongolia with a proposal to create an
ethnically-based Inner Mongol party, to be called the People's Revo
lutionary Party of Inner Mongolia.
On the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement and the People’s
Revolutionary Party from 1924 to 1931, see Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei
zhanzheng shiqi de Nei Menggu Renmin Geming Dang," in Zhongguo
Menggu Shi Xuehui chengli dahui jinian Jikan (Khokliekhota, 1979),
580-604, L. Jamsran, "MAKhN, Owdr Mongolyn Ardyn kliuwisgalt nam
liiisch bekhjikhed tusalsan ni," Dornodakhiny sudlal, 1991, no. 1 (24), 11-17,
and Christopher A^vood, "National Party and Local Politics in Ordos, Inner
Mongolia (1926-1935)," Journal ofAsian History 26 (1992), 1-30.
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, Central Party Archives
(Ulaanbaatar), 7-1-29: 13, 26-27; 7-1-20: 42-43, A. Lumburai, "Ard)m
Tsergiin ankhny tagnuulch," Ardyn Erkh, Oct. 4, 1991, no. 17 (243), 4;
Christopher Atwood, "Nationalism and Localism: the Origins of the People’s
Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia" (M.A. Thesis, Indiana University,
1990), 78-81.
Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (v. 408), 107-109; "Shou
Wai Menggu yingxiang zhi Nei Menggu chihua yundong," Chen Bao
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Probably the earliest Inner Mongols to get in contact with the
Soviet embassy were some agrarian radicals from Ordos, on the bend
of the Yellow River in southwest Inner Mongolia.
From the
mid-nineteenth century, these radicals had been organized into
duguilangs, or "circles." In recent years, however, the native Mongol
princes, helped by the Chinese military authorities, had almost entirely
suppressed the duguilangs. The rebel leaders were forced to either
stop their activity or go into exile. Among the exiles were two in Bei
jing: Wangdanima, the Bandida Gegen, or incarnate lama of Jasag
Banner, and Oljeijirgal, a clerk and duguilang leader from Uiishin
banner. Wangdanima was close to Serengdonrub's group, but the
Uiishin leader, Oljeijirgal, aimed to link the Ordos duguilangs directly
to the new Mongolian government. He left for Mongolia in August,
1924, taking fifteen duguilang comrades from Uiishin banner with him
to plead for aid and acquire a political and military education.
In the fall of 1924, another of the Chinese republic’s intermin
able warlord conflicts had broken out. This time. Marshal Feng
Yuxiang (1882-1948), a relatively progressive-minded commander, was
able to occupy Beijing. He declared a truce, however, with the
reactionary Zhang Zuolin (18757-1928), warlord of Northeast China, a
truce which allowed Zhang's forces to share in the occupation of Bei
jing. Feng expelled the former Qing Emperor, Puyi, from the Forbid
den City, declared that the Chinese republic would tolerate no more
monarchist revivals and renamed his troops the Citizen Army {Guominjun). By December 1925, Feng’s Citizen Army had taken control
of the western half of Inner Mongolia.^*
Overnight, this development changed the political possibilities in
Inner Mongolia. Merse, from the Eastern Border People's Party, went
south to Beijing to examine the new situation. There he met Guomindang Mongols in Beijing, such as Serengdonrub. Together, in early
December 1924, they formed the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner
Mongolia that had first been proposed to Mongolia the previous

(Beijing), Jan. 31, 1927; Zhonghua Minguo shishi jiyao (chugao) 1924, vol.
1 (Yonghe County, 1979), 416-7; MPRP, Central Party Archives, 7-1-20;
8-11,7-1-19: 1.
James C. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng
Yti-hsiang (Stanford, 1966); Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast
China: 1911-1928 (Stanford, 1977).

A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia

59

April.39 Sun Yat-sen, leading the pro-Soviet Guomindang party in
southern China, also saw great opportunities for a peaceful reunifica
tion of China. That month, Sun Yat-sen came north to Beijing and
appointed Guomindang party representatives to go to each province
and agitate for a National Assembly. Serengdonrub and a young
Communist Mongol were appointed to do this work among the Mon
gols of Inner Mongolia.'^®
Marshal Feng's new territory, however large, lacked either a
seaport or an arsenal. If he wished to keep his Citizen Army armed he
would have to turn to the Soviet Union which could supply him over
land via the Mongolian People's Republic. From March on, the
Chinese Citizen Armies and the Soviet Union began courting each
other. In this new atmosphere, Soviet citizens acquired a new freedom
to leave the embassy and visit the countryside. Until then they had only
been able to work in Beijing. There, in summer, 1924, Oshirov, going
under the more standard Mongol form of his name (either as Ochir,
Ochirov, or Ochirun), had begun working out of the Soviet Union's
Beijing embassy, along with a Russian military man named Ledogorov.
In that year, Oshirov got to know some popular leaders from the Ordos
region in western Inner Mongolia. Oshirov impressed them as a good
man, but his Russian customs, such as embracing and kissing old
acquaintances mystified the more traditional Ordos Mongols.In
March, 1925, however, A.I. Oshirov, in the company of He Zishen, a
representative of the Chinese Communist Party's Beijing-based
Northern Committee, made what was probably his first trip into the
Inner Mongolian countryside.
Through the summer of 1925, Oshirov's main task, along with
Comintern representatives in Mongolia itself, like Turar R. Ryskulov,
39 Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn Dorowdugeer Ikh Khural:
1925 yesdugeer saryn 23—arawdugaar saryn 1: delgerengui tailan
(Ulaanbaatar, 1978), 50; MPRP, Central Party Archives: 7-1-18; 22-23;
7-1-29: 16-17.
Luo Jialun and Huang Jilu, Qd&.,'Guofu nianpu (Taipei, 1969),
1169-1170.
Uiisin qosigun-u Sinelam-a-yin durasqal-un suburg-a bosqagsan
yosulal-un yeke quralun uduriduqu duguyilang, Gilaljagsan nigen nasu
(Uiishin Banner, 1985), 100-101.
Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian
(1919.5.4-1949.10.1)," 'm Nei Menggu shizhi ziliao xuanbian, vol. 7, Dashiji
zhuanze (Khokhekhota; n.d.), 187.
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was getting the disparate political groups in Inner Mongolia to cease
relying solely on salvation from Mongolia, and begin relying more on
each other. The new People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia
(PRPIM, Mongolian Dotoodu Monggol-un Arad-un Khubiskhaltu
Nam) encompassed Serengdonrub’s Guomindang group, as well as
some of the Khdlon Buir group and Wangdanima from the Ordos
group. Yet the Khdlon Buir-based Eastern Border People's Party
(EBPP) was still officially separate with much of its leadership in
Ulaanbaatar. In February 1925, another party appeared, the Inner
Mongolian Youth Party (Dotoodu Monggol-un Jaluuchud-un Nam)A^
It was composed of young Mongol students from Beijing's Mongolian
and Tibetan school, in their twenties or late teens, almost all from ban
ners with heavy Chinese settlement where the Mongols themselves
were beginning to take up farming. The party was inspired by Sosordawa, a Mongol from independent Mongolia's youth league, who in
fall, 1924, came to Beijing to proclaim the gospel of radical
pan-Mongolist ideas. Pan-Mongolian in its thinking, the Youth Party
was strongly hostile to the PRPIM, calling it the party of the rich and
the nobility.
All of these parties were in a competition for the favor of the
Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) or both.
Originally the EBPP had the inside track in Ulaanbaatar, but its patron
Rinchino was recalled to Buriatia that summer in semi-disgrace. The
PRPIM had two advantages which proved telling; it carried with it the
blessing of support from Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang center and
it counted members from all over Inner Mongolia. Given that the
Soviet Union was committed to the Guomindang as the central force in
China's revolution (and that it hoped to build up a powerful all-inner
Mongolian organization), these two properties were crucial. In con
trast, the EBPP was amorphous and existed only in a small area, and
the Youth Party was too young, too socially radical, and too
pan-Mongolist.
This party should not be confused either with the "Khdlon Buir
Youth Party," the commonly found, unofficial name of the Eastern Border
People’s Party (EBPP), or the Young Men’s Party of South Mongolia (Obdr
Monggol-un Jaluus-un Nam) of the 1940s.
44 Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, Wulanfu huiyilu (Beijing,
1989), 56-57; MPRP, Central Party Archives; 7-1-23; 12; 7-1-73; 6; 7-1-26:
31-37, 49-53.
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The People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia got in
touch with visiting Mongolian dignitaries in late April, 1925. Party
members approached the Soviet embassy in Beijing in the second half
of May, 1925, if not before, and the ambassador Karakhan was
amenable to arming Inner Mongol troops as long as approval for such a
force by Marshal Feng, the local authority, could be arranged. As one
embassy report, possibly by Oshirov, put it:
We must admit that . . . even supposing that these organizations
[the PRPIM and an alliance of Chinese militias] as a whole will
be able to get together only one half of the number of men they
promised, i.e. 5,000, still such a mass of cavalry in the rear of
Chang Tso-lin [Zhang Zuolin] may decide the issue of the war."^^
From May to July 1925, Serengdonrub and comrades were in Ulaanbaatar negotiating with the leadership of the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party (MPRP). Their proposals envisioned a merger of
the PRPIM with the EBPP, the subordination of both to the MPRP,
and financial and military aid from the Soviet Union and Mongolia."^^
The MPRP supported these proposals, as long as the role of the
MPRP was kept secret, and was preparing to send a representative to
Moscow to ratify this policy. In July, however, Grigorii Voitinskii, the
Comintern representative in Shanghai and Oshirov's boss, passed
through Ulaanbaatar on unrelated business. When he heard what was
going on, he asked the MPRP to delay sending any representative to
Moscow. Voitinskii asked that the MPRP not interfere directly in the
affairs of the Inner Mongolian party, leaving that up to the Communist
International's organization in China. The crucial point was that policy
towards Inner Mongolia had to be coordinated with policy towards
China, especially towards the Guomindang and Marshal Feng's Citizen
Army. Serengdonrub and the others had no choice but to go along—
after all, what they needed above all was money and weapons, and
ultimately the Soviet Union was the only source for that—but the Inner
Mongols were not happy about it."^^
The task of unifying the Inner Mongolian parties was compli
cated by the role of Li Dazhao (1888-1927), the main Chinese ComSulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (v. 408), 112.
MPRP Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 24-26, 29-31.
Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn Ddrowdiigeer Ikh Khural,
50-51; MPRP Central Party Archives: 4-1-364: 19-20; 7-1-26: 3; 7-1-19: 2.
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munist in Beijing
Although he himself insisted that the Inner Mon
golian revolution was an inter-ethnic task, involving both Chinese and
Mongols, Li was influential among the young Mongol students in Bei
jing, even among those who formed the Youth Party. Li assigned a
Chinese disciple of his, Han Linfu, to bring together an Inner Mongo
lian front organization that would embody the Communist program of
an inter-ethnic Inner Mongolian struggle. Han was unable to recruit
successfully among Mongols, however, and hence turned to ethnic
Chinese farmers and bandit groups in the southern part of Inner Mon
golia, with only a few Mongol students participating. The resulting
front, called the Grand Alliance of Inner Mongolian Peasants, Workers,
and Soldiers, approached Oshirov at the Soviet embassy in May, 1925,
asking for it to intercede with Marshal Feng on their behalf, and also to
supply them with ammunition.
The Soviet embassy was thus presented with a murky,
three-cornered relationship between the Grand Alliance, the Youth
Party, and the PRPIM. The Grand Alliance had some kind of relations
with the PRPIM, but they were not close. The Youth Party and Serengdonrub’s PRPIM were both exclusively Mongol parties, but the
former was younger, more radical, and more alienated from the Mongol
elite. The Grand Alliance's idea of a multi-ethnic revolutionary struggle
would seem to exclude the Youth Party's pan-Mongolism, but in
recruiting Mongols the Chinese Communist Party and the Youth Party
successfully drew on essentially the same pool of students in Beijing's
Mongolian and Tibetan School. Many young Mongols joined the
Youth Party and the Chinese Communist Party simultaneously.
The ramifications of these conflicts extended beyond Inner
Mongolian politics alone. Li Dazhao and Han Linfu were not only
Communists, they were also members of the Guomindang, and among
the most active members of the Beijing Political Council (BPC), the
major GMD organization in northern China.The BPC handled
See Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese
Marxism (New York, 1973).
Chang Kuo-t’ao, The Rise of the Communist Party, vol. 1,
1921-1927 (Lawrence, 1971), 129, 338; MPRP Central Party Archives:
7-1-23: 12.
The Beijing Political Council contained nine members, of whom
four, Li Dazhao, Han Linfii (Communist faction), Xu Qian (Left Guomin
dang), and Yu Youren (centrist), showed evidence of interest in the Inner
Mongolian question.
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negotiations both with the Mongolian People's Republic and with the
Soviet Union. Serengdonnab, despite having been appointed by Sun
Yat-sen as the chief GMD figure in Inner Mongolia, was not a member
and a rivalry between Li Dazhao and Serengdonrub over who would
control Inner Mongolian policy can be traced back as far as the First
Congress of the GMD in January 1924. Since Serengdonrub was close
to Dambadorji and other members of the Mongolian government, ten
sion between him and the PRPIM on the one hand and Li, Han, the
BPC, and the Inner Mongolian Youth Party on the other, could derail
the already not-very-stable relations between Mongolia and the GMD.
At the same time, it could lead to an exacerbation of relations between
the right and left in the United Front the Comintern was trying to hold
together.
It fell to Oshirov to try to reconcile the two Inner Mongol
parties. Both were too promising to be ignored: in July-August, the
PRPIM had 300 full members and 3,000 candidates, while the Youth
Party had only 30 full members but somewhere between 800 to 1,500
candidate members.^ 1 When Serengdonrub returned to Beijing in July,
he met with Karakhan, Oshirov, and Li Dazhao. The latter, in his
capacity as a member of the BPC, gave the formal approval of the
Guomindang to organize the PRPIM, but seems to have extracted an
understanding from Serengdonrub that his hitherto all-Mongol
organization would admit ethnic Chinese.^^ Serengdonrub refused to
accept this denouement, however, and relations between the PRPIM
and the Soviet Union and the BPC seem to have cooled. At the party's
Provisional Meeting of July 26, 1925, the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party (MPRP)'s representative in Beijing attended, but
neither Oshirov nor any representative of the Soviet Union or the BPC
was invited. Serengdonrub’s report (delivered at the assembly) on the
latest party activities mentioned only the mission to Ulaanbaatar and
ignored all of the important talks with the Soviet embassy.
Afterwards, however, Oshirov proved to Serengdonrub the
worth of the Comintern ties by mediating a dispute between the Youth
Party and the PRPIM. By the middle of August, notes one observer,
"He has given [the two parties] the appearance of friendship," and.
Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn Dordwdugeer Ikh Khiiral, 51;
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-26: 52; 7-1-23: 12.
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-23: 11.
MPRP Central Party Archives; 7-1-26; 1-2; foto-fond B3.01.1.
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perhaps as a reward, Oshirov was invited to join in drawing up the
documents to be ratified at the October Congress. By the opening of
the first Congress of the PRPIM, which would seal the unification of
the various groups, Oshirov had managed to get the Inner Mongolia
Youth Party to dissolve and join the PRPIM in a subordinate role. The
new party, however, would be a purely ethnic Mongol party. No ethnic
Chinese would be given membership. The Grand Alliance was kept
separate, although the two ethnic Mongols in its leadership were
elected as alternate members of the PRPIM's Central Committee.
The Inner Mongolian Party was to have deliberative rights in the
Comintern's Congresses, just as did the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party and the Chinese Guomindang.^^
Meanwhile in Ulaanbaatar, Oljeijirgal was informed that the
MPRP would provide no direct aid to him or the Uiishin duguilangs.
Assistance would come only through the PRPIM.
Reluctantly,
Oljeijirgal agreeed to attend the first Congress, planned for October in
Zhangjiakou. The remaining members of the Eastern Border People's
Party also tried to preserve their organizational independence, pointing
out how the special geographical position of Kholon Buir made
revolutionary prospects there especially bright, but the EBPP too was
pushed into union with the PRPIM.

The Rehe and Ordos Campaigns: 1925-1927
By the time of the first, constituent. Congress of the PRPIM,
A.I. Oshirov had begun to establish his position as an adviser on
northern Chinese politics. When the question came up of who to send
as the MPRP’s representative to the Guomindang, Amagaev, the
Comintern's representative in Ulaanbaatar, asked that the Central
Committee first consult with Oshirov. At the Congress, Oshirov was
Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 11-12; 7-1-26: 49-51; Zhang
Jingru, and others, Li Dazhao shengping shiliao biannian (Shanghai, 1984),
262-3.
"Report of the Credentials Commission," International Press Correspondance, vol. 8 (no. 81), Nov. 21, 1928, 1532. In fact, the first and only
Comintern Congress ever held during the PRPIM CC’s period of existence
was the Sixth, in 1928, in which two PRPIM representatives did participate
with deliberative rights. The assignment of a regular Comintern representative
to the party would seem to indicate, however, that the PRPIM was treated as a
candidate member of the Comintern before then as well.
Central Party Archives, 4-1-364: 81; 7-1-29: 14-15; 7-1-20:14.
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one of only three outsiders included in the official photographs-the
others were Dambadorji, the chairman of the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party, and Buyannemekhu, a talented Mongolian writer
and poet sent to help the Inner Mongols with propaganda and
pamphleteering.
Even so, in negotiations over supplying Soviet
weapons for a planned Inner Mongol military force, it was not Oshirov
but Grigorii Voitinskii and the assistant military attache Voronin who
had the authority to commit the Soviet side.^^
For the next year and a half, Oshirov would follow the Central
Committee as it campaigned first in Rehe and then as it retreated west
into Ordos. Yet far from acting as the all-powerful Comintern agent,
dictating strategy, he appears in the record primarily as a messenger for
the Central Committee. His main task seems to have been to assure a
steady supply of guns and money to the party. He did not receive much
thanks for taking on this task. Nowhere are his endeavors noted with
the kind of generous thanks which Serengdonrub and Merse expressed
about Nasunbatu (1891-1937), a Mongolian Central Committee
member sent to Inner Mongolia to advise the PRPIM from August to
November, 1926. Again, Oshirov's age may well have been a factorhe was ten to fifteen years younger than the leaders of the PRPIM.
Indeed, in biographical notices on the PRPIM leaders he consistently
overestimated their ages by five years or more.^^
Yet another factor may have been his lack of any significant
Buriat revolutionary experience. Nowhere in the two lengthy reports
on the party that he wrote for the Soviet embassy or in the letter he
wrote to the party CC does he ever refer to the historical experiences
of Buriatia in the Russian Civil War, or indeed to any aspect of Buriat
politics at all. This deprived him of the chance to deliver instruction as
one more experienced in the art of Revolution, a pose which Borodin,
Voitinskii, and other Russians in China frequently adopted.Indeed
MPRP Central Party Archives: 4-1-364: 81; Rupen, Mongols of
the Twentieth Century, figure 28 (Oshirov in the back row, with a tie); Sulian
yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (408), 103. Voronin, the assistant Soviet
military attache also participated in these negotiations on weapons supply.
Compare the ages in Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (v.
408), 107-109 to Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei zhanzheng shiqi de Nei
Menggu Renmin Geming Dang," in Zhongguo Menggu Shi Xuehui chengli
dahui jinian jikan, 600-601.
For example, Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China,
1917-1924 (Stanford, 1953), 245-246; C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen:

66

Christopher A twood

he at least once overestimated the experience of his Inner Mongol col
laborators, claiming that one Murungga had been elected to the Chinese
parliament and worked with Sun Yat-sen, when in fact it was
Murungga’s father who had done so.^®
Yet in his reports, especially his final report on the party, deliv
ered to the embassy on December 6, 1926, before he left for Southern
China, Oshirov shows an understanding of the local politics of Inner
Mongolia, both as it related to the personalities in the party and the
local political realities. Unlike other Soviet advisers, he was well aware
of Marshal Feng's unpopularity among the Mongol grass- roots.^^ He
was also able to overcome common prejudices among foreigners about
Mongolian lamas and accurately relate their unexpectedly "progressive"
attitude to the local economic background. Finally, he seems to have
been the only outsider to discern the profound internal cleavages
among the Inner Mongols, and relate them to differing levels of
influence by Chinese culture. His main deficiency was a tendency to be
carried away with enthusiasm. He always managed to find a silver
lining in every cloud. For example, in discussing the sharp personal
feuds which wracked the party, he concluded that these very feuds
made each leader anxious to recruit more followers, which led to a
rapid expansion of the party ranks.^^
At the same time, he also
showed little awareness of the aims and counsels of Serengdonrub, who
became increasingly autocratic as the party's fortunes waned. Thus
although his reports do contain sharp insights, they tend to be
impressionistic, lacking a sense of what the inner council was planning
at any given moment. Serengdonrub seems to have aimed at keeping
the Soviet representative at arm's length while drawing the Mongolian
government in closer.
After its October Congress, the PRPIM became closely
involved in the campaigns of Feng's Citizen Army. Growing tensions
with Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian Army led, on November 22, 1925, to

Frustrated Patriot (New York, 1976), 178, 193; Xenia Joukoff Eudin and
Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary
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war. On December 3, 1925, Marshal Feng ordered his First Army to
invade Rehe.^^
According to the agreements reached after the
Congress, the PRPIM was to lead a Mongol force to take over the
northern part of this region—Jingpeng, Linxi, and Wudan counties—
while another army formed from bandits led by Li Dazhao's Grand
Alliance of Inner Mongolian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers was to
capture Chifeng. By the time that Feng had ordered the attack,
however, the weapons promised from the Soviet Union to arm the
Inner Mongols still had not come.
In early November, Voitinskii and the embassy's assistant mili
tary attache, Voronin, asked the Mongols to send some of their
Soviet-supplied weapons to Inner Mongolia with the understanding
that the Soviet Union would replace them. The replies from Ulaanbaatar, however, avoided mentioning weapons. On November 13, the
party's Central Committee then wrote an imploring letter to the MPRP
Central Committee asking them to act quickly. Likewise, Oshirov "on
instructions from the Inner Mongolian People’s Party [i.e., the
PRPIM]" wired Dambadorji and Amagaev from Beijing to send weap
ons and if necessary borrow them from Soviet stores on hand.^'^ The
existing PRPIM troops, formed from a local Mongol banner militia,
numbered 500-600, of whom little more than half were armed. The
commander Murungga, a presidium member and local official, had been
chosen to lead because the basic militia had earlier been his own force.
Although the weapons had not arrived, Murungga attacked anyway.
Miraculously the troops succeeded in taking all the cities assigned to
them. The low morale of the enemy soldiers, ravaged by opium, and
the conspicuous cowardice of their commanders who fled at the first
report of enemy action were responsible for this easy victory. The
Inner Mongol army swelled to 3,000—of whom perhaps 1,100 were
armed.
Oshirov had been near the front, but went back to Beijing
before the capture of Wudan. Based on a letter from Murungga dated
December 12, he delivered an optimistic report to his superiors, detail
ing the party's plans to expand the army to five thousand and develop
the offensive towards the northwest, eventually into Kholon Buir.
On the Rehe campaign see Oshirov’s report of December 17,
1925, with comments by Egorov, the Beijing military attache in Sulian
yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 7 (v.408), 101-109.
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 4-7; 7-1-23: 52.
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Buried in his report, though, appeared ominous problems.
In the
report, he assessed the commander, Murungga, as earnest and energetic
but "scarcely a real military leader." The weapons requested from
Mongolia had not arrived and the Mongol force, whose ranks were
swelled by defectors, was still more than half unarmed. Relations
between the people and the army were good, but there was no political
activity and no political workers to carry it out.
Murungga reported incredibly low casualty figures for the Mon
gol unit—one dead and four wounded, with 1,000 of the enemy cap
tured at Wudan alone. These figures made it clear either that the front
line was not being entirely candid in its reports or that the Mongol
force had won against no genuine resistance. Clearly the victories of
the first ten days of combat were windfalls, something which the party
could not rely on repeating in the face of genuine opposition. Oshirov,
however, gave no indication of having tried to restrain Murungga from
his plans for further expansion, even though consolidation was obvi
ously necessary.
Within a few days, the tide turned against the Citizen Arjny. In
three days of fighting against Zhang Zuolin's armies on the banks of the
Liao River, the vanguard of the Citizen Armies was thrown into a
chaotic retreat. By New Year's Day, Marshal Feng was in the mood to
make peace; he resigned and went to the Soviet Union in the hopes that
his removal might make prevent his enemies from allying against him.
In January, however, Wu Peifli, leader of the Central Chinese warlord
clique, and Zhang Zuolin came to terms and formed an alliance against
Feng. Zhang’s armies moved back into the Rehe region in February,
1926.
The pamphlets, instructors and some of the weapons demanded
in mid-December did finally arrive from Ulaanbaatar late in that month
and in the following January.^^ The Central Committee, however,
seems to have lacked any firm plan, moving first from Zhangjiakou to
Dolonnuur (to be closer to the front), then to Beijing (to try to control
the Central Government's Court of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs),
and then off to Ulaanbaatar (to consult with the MPRP).^^ As Oshirov
Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 2 (v. 403), Guo . . ., 46a;
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 9, 23-24.
66 MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-18: 20-21; 7-1-19: 10; S.
Rentsensonom, "Owor Mongolyn tuiikhen amidral," typescript in the archives
of the Oriental and International Institute (folder 2-4-4), 51
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ruefully acknowledged later, many of the youth and officials who joined
the party were wavering elements who dropped out when the tide
turned against it.^"^ By the beginning of March, the whole of Rehe was
in the hands of Zhang Zuolin's lieutenants, while less than fifty of the
party's quondam 3,000-strong cavalry, escaped west to regroup in
Suiyuan.68 Murungga's reputation, as well as those of others involved
in the fiasco, seems to have suffered a major blow; he spent the next
year in Mongolia, with no active role to speak of
Along with the fall of Rehe, Beijing also fell into the hands of
the advancing armies. Even before the forces of Zhang Zuolin arrived,
the care-taker government of Duan Qirui had cracked down on
Guomindang activity. All the members of the Beijing Political Council
fled: some like Xu Qian and Yu Youren fled to Mongolia to join
Marshal Feng; others like the Communists Li Dazhao took refuge in the
Soviet embassy. The embassy itself entered into a virtual state of siege.
Embassy officials themselves were allowed limited movement, but
anyone in contact with them was liable to be arrested. Unfortunately,
Oshirov's movements, like much else about the Inner Mongolian party
movement in this period, are obscure.
By the end of August, 1926, however, we know that Oshirov
was with Serengdonrub, Merse, and some other members of the Cen
tral Committee, were preparing a desperate attempt to establish a base
in the Ordos region.^9 jhe Citizen Army's attempt to halt the advance
of Zhang Zuolin northwest of Beijing had failed, and the force was
disintegrating in the wake of defeat, turning into a predatory bandit
horde that picked clean the roads west. The PRPIM originally thought
that the remnants of the Citizen Army would retreat all the way to
Gansu, leaving virtually all of the Chinese-settled areas of Inner
Mongolia under the control of Zhang Zuolin. They hoped to build a
rural base in the surrounding ethnically Mongolian steppes in which the
party could subsist until a favorable turn in events occurred. In spring
and summer, Wangdanima and Oljeijirgal had very encouraging success

Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 2 (v. 403), San . . ., 1 lb.
68 Nozu Akira ("Yejin Peng"), trans. Jin Hai, "Nei Menggu chihua
yundong de bianqian," in Nei Menggu Daxue Zhong-Gong Nei Menggu Diqu
Dangshi Yanjiu Suo, ed., Nei Menggu jindai shi yi cong (Khokhekhota,
1986), 128-9.
69 On this campaign in Ordos, see Oshirov’s report of December 7,
1926, in Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, vol. 2 (v. 403), San . . ., 2b-12a.
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in getting duguilang members of several Ordos banners to join the
party. In several places though, the local rulers reacted with brutal
crackdowns, arresting, executing, or fining any who had connection
with the "Red Party."
In late August, the Central Committee, accompanied both by
Oshirov and the MPRP adviser, Nasunbatu, began a sweep through
Ordos. Bringing a motley force of Ordos troops and the remnant of the
Rehe campaign along with stores of about 300 rifles, they armed the
duguilang!T()?LViy supporters, and forced the banner authorities to sign
agreements that granted freedom of political activity to the duguilangs
and the PRPIM. All the new military forces were placed under the
ultimate control of the Central Committee. Despite the sudden death of
Wangdanima on the eve of departure, the expedition was a tremendous
success, with the party members achieving power in all but the two
northeastern banners of Ordos.
In his only first-hand prolonged contact with the Inner Mongo
lian countryside, Oshirov was struck above all by the insularity of the
society and economy. Economically there was no unity even within the
Ordos, let alone on an all-inner Mongolian scale. Each banner
depended upon the neighboring Chinese areas for trade, and the result
ing Chinese disunity had political repercussions as each Chinese
province cultivated ties with neighboring banner princes and strove to
keep each banner hostile to the others. Internally, Oshirov was struck
by the odd phenomenon that the high lamas and incarnations tended to
be vigorous supporters of the party and its reforms, while the secular
nobility clung tenaciously to their old privileges. He attributed this
unexpected support to the prestige of Wangdanima, who was one of
the highest ranking incarnate lamas in the Ordos. Probing still deeper,
though, he pinpointed the divisive role of Chinese colonization. The
secular nobility used its administrative power to profit from the sale of
Mongol lands and to secure bottom-soil rents from the immigrant
Chinese tenants.
The lamas, however, who depended upon steady contributions
from the faithful for their living, suffered as the Mongols were moved
off the land and replaced by Chinese (who did not patronize the old
monasteries). At Bagshi-yin Siime, Wangdanima's old residence, where
Chinese colonization had been especially heavy, the several hundred
resident lamas were patronized by only thirty households of Mongols.
Thus the "religious feudalists" strongly supported the party's calls for
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responsible rule that would put the interests of the Mongol people as a
whole above the selfish interests of the princes.
At the same time, Oshirov also remarked on the tension
between the Mongols from eastern Inner Mongolia and those from
Ordos. The East Mongols (as they called themselves), along with some
Chinese, were concentrated in the force of forty to fifty soldiers that
had been recruited in the Rehe campaign to the east. They also
included, of course, Serengdonrub and many other prominent leaders in
the Central Committee. The East Mongols considered themselves the
most learned and advanced Mongols, due to their contact with secular,
Chinese-oriented education, and looked down upon the Ordos Mongols
as benighted and backwards herdsmen. Yet the problem was more
severe than mere bad feeling. Oshirov did not inform his superiors that
early in this campaign the two groups in the party's armed escort had
come to blows and the Central Committee had been forced to execute
two East Mongol youths for attempted mutiny. Here he was clearly
covering for the party leadership, assuming (correctly) that no amount
of explanation would overcome the impression of instability such news
would cause.
Oshirov and Nasunbatu returned to Baotou when the expedition
into Ordos was about half over.^^ Since the expedition had left for
Ordos, many important things had happened. Marshal Feng had
returned to Inner Mongolia, and openly joined the Guomindang party,
officially putting his army under the Guomindang Canton government.
Simultaneously, the Guomindang armies were scoring enormous suc
cess in their northern expedition, rapidly reaching the Yangtze valley.
The news threw much of the Inner Mongolian party leadership into a
temporary euphoria. The planned Second Congress, to be held in the
Ordos countryside, was abandoned and the leadership hurried back to
See Serengdonrub’s defense of the executions in MPRP Central
Party Archives: 7-1-19: 36-42, and the criticism of them at the 1927 Party
Congress in Ulaanbaatar in Rentsensonom, "Owor Mongolyn tiiukhen amidral” (Oriental and International Institute Archive: 2-4-4), 53.
Compare the lists of signatories on agreements in Uiishin Banner
(October 1, 1926), where Oshirov and Nasunbatu are present and Otog
Banner (October 10, 1926), where they are absent—MPRP Central Party
Archives: 7-1-20: 54-55, 56-58.
On China’s national revolution, see C. Martin Wilbur,
Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China,
7920-7927 (Cambridge, 1989).
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Baotou to ask for Feng's approval to set up an Inner Mongolian Citizen
Army. Feng seemed to approve, but showed far more enthusiasm for
abolishing the Mongolian nobility and their traditional jurisdictions than
for establishing any ethnic-democratic institutions in their place.
The great successes of the Guomindang in their southern bases
suggested an alternative source of support. Perhaps the new National
Government, now moving its headquarters from Canton to Wuhan on
the Yangtze River, might be able to supply the PRPIM with money and
weapons. Due to the occupation of Beijing by Zhang Zuolin’s
counter-revolutionary armies, however, the party was unable to receive
any reply from Wuhan. Thus A.I. Oshirov, along with Sainbayar, was
dispatched to go to Wuhan and try to get aid from the Guomindang.
The party’s aim was to get 100,000 silver dollars and 5,000
rifles from the Guomindang. Oshirov may have chosen to go in order
to get back in touch with Voitinskii, in Shanghai, but the mission was
not suited to him. It required above all the ability to impress Chinese
leaders who knew little or nothing about Inner Mongolia. The mini
mum requirement would be a fluent command of Chinese and some
kind of name-recognition among the Chinese. Oshirov himself did not
know Chinese, although his Inner Mongol companion, Sainbayar, did.
Unfortunately, Sainbayar was the most junior member of the Presidium
of the PRPIM's Central Committee and had no reputation at all.
Apparently Oshirov and Sainbayar were dispatched largely because
they were considered expendable in the eyes of the party's leadership,
especially Serengdonrub. At the same time as Oshirov was being sent
away, Nasunbatu, the Mongolian representative, was appointed com
missar for the party’s new Military and Political School. After Nasun
batu had returned to Mongolia in December, Serengdonrub and Merse
repeatedly told the MPRP what an excellent person Nasunbatu was and
how delighted the PRPIM would be if it could have another direct
representative from the MPRP.^^ Clearly the PRPIM valued its link to
Mongolia far above that to the Soviet Union.

Mission to the South, December, 1926-March, 1927
Oshirov left in early December as the party center was
preparing to move west.^'^ Marshal Feng's open adherence to the
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 19, 35; 7-1-18: 17-18.
Material for this section, unless otherwise noted, is drawn from the
letter of March 8, 1927, sent by A.I. Oshirov from Verkhneudinsk to the
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Guomindang had not strengthened his armies in Inner Mongolia; quite
the contrary, it diverted his attention towards linking up with the GMD
forces in Henan. Lacking the mounts to move them, his troops
exploded millions of rounds of Italian ammunition as they evacuated
Baotou, leaving the roadside littered with guns and ammunition
dropped by the exhausted and demoralized troops.
Oshirov and Sainbayar arrived in Beijing and handed in a fairly
optimistic report to the Soviet embassy on December 7. The situation
in Beijing was depressing. The Fengtian Army’s white terror was in
evidence everywhere. Engkhebatu, one of the founders of the party,
was in jail and Oshirov, as a foreigner, was not allowed to see him. He
was able to see the wife of Alta (Wu Zixing) another promising party
leader who had disappeared while bringing money from Mongolia for
the party's use. Alta had, in fact, been captured and executed by Zhang
Zuolin's troops. Party members would come to Beijing from Inner
Mongolia surreptitiously looking for someone with whom they could
connect. Finding no one, they would depart fearful and disappointed.
The only good news was that the Soviet embassy had received
Oshirov’s earlier report on the Ordos situation as well as the Central
Committee’s request to the Guomindang for aid. The embassy had
wired the former to "the appropriate places" (probably meaning
Voitinskii in Shanghai) and the latter to the Guomindang Party center.
No reply was received. Li Dazhao, then trapped in the Soviet embassy
and representing the remnants of the GMD in Beijing, subsequently
suggested that going on to Wuhan would be better. The embassy pro
vided travelling expenses for the trip.
Oshirov and Sainbayar spent little more than a week in Beijing.
Then they sailed to Shanghai, where they spent most of their time with
Voitinskii detailing the whole course of events. Voitinskii wired a
status report to Moscow, together with the request for 100,000 silver
dollars and 5,000 guns. In the preceding six months, Moscow had sent
several telegrams questioning Grigorii on the progress of events in
Inner Mongolia. It was only with Oshirov’s report that he was able to
answer the questions.
Oshirov had arrived at Shanghai at a crucial moment in the
Northern expedition. The Nationalist armies had liberated Hunan,
Central Committee of the PRPIM (MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19:
57-63).
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-19: 14-15.
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Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces. In the course of December, 1926, the
personnel of the National Government, which had been proclaimed lit
tle more than a year ago in Canton, began an uncoordinated migration
north to Wuhan. As the columns passed through Nanchang, the capital
of Jiangxi, however, the commander-in-chief of the National Revolu
tionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek tried to persuade as many as possible to
stay there.Already political disagreements were surfacing while two
alternative centers coalesced, one in Wuhan, where Borodin and Xu
Qian, a former member of the BPC and past participant in negotiations
with Mongolia, held power, and the other in Nanchang where Chiang
Kai-shek and his military adviser Vasilii Bliicher held sway. Although
Shanghai was still under warlord rule, the Nationalist party comrades
there were already beginning to take sides in the budding conflict.
Most supported Chiang and suggested that Oshirov go to Nanchang.
Oshirov took a boat to Nanchang, arriving there on January 7
or 8, 1927. Although he come ostensibly to see the Commander-inChief Chiang, Oshirov felt cautious about involving the Inner
Mongolian cause in the party split. Just before they arrived the army
officers and party leaders in the city had convened and called for the
National Government to move to Nanchang. So having arrived in
Nanchang, Oshirov and Sainbayar waited until Chiang Kai-shek had left
for Wuhan himself and then followed him the next day, January 12.
When they arrived at the harborside, they saw for the first time the
mass character of the Chinese revolution. The people of Wuhan had
begun to drive the British out of their concessions and the foreigners'
women and children had gone aboard warships floating off shore, while
the men planned to defend the concessions with guns. Oshirov
concluded that the right wing of the Guomindang had become
frightened that the masses might "become completely red," and hence
demanded that the government be moved to Nanchang and put under
Commander Chiang. The left wanted to keep the party's Central
Committee in charge, while the right wished to put it under the army,
and break with the Communists. Oshirov’s own sympathies were
clearly with the left.
When Oshirov met Xu Qian and Borodin together, the Wuhan
leaders tried to be encouraging. Xu Qian, whom Oshirov probably
knew from the summer of 1925 negotiations in Beijing, said: "The
See Vera Vladimirovna-Akimova, trans. Steven I. Levine, Two
Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927 (Cambridge, 1971), 254-277.
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Guomindang will certainly help Inner Mongolia.
One hundred
thousand joian is nothing, but still this should be decided in a meeting
of the standing committee of the Guomindang." Borodin added that "It
would be hard to confirm it now, when [the party] is split into two
groups. We should wait until these people themselves understand what
is happening and come back to re-unite. So there’s no reason for you
to hurry." Only after talking with them did Oshirov and Sainbayar meet
Chiang Kai-shek. As they outlined the need for money and rifles for
Inner Mongolia, Oshirov knew enough Chinese to understand Chiang's
occasional comments of shi, shi ("yes, yes") and duile, duile ("right,
right"). When they concluded, Chiang, too, said this couldn’t be
decided all at once and asked them to submit a written request. Sain
bayar wrote one up in Chinese and submitted it, but on January 25,
Chiang suddenly left for Nanchang after a public quarrel with Borodin,
so they never had a chance to address the issue again.
Clearly, affairs in Inner Mongolia were not on anyone’s priority
list in Wuhan. Xu Qian, feeling perhaps a twinge of conscience that
these negotiations, like the ones with Mongolia he’d participated in a
year and a half ago would again die for lack of interest on the Chinese
side, arranged a last meeting of the Wuhan government leaders. As
Oshirov later reported:
After we two stupid Mongols {buduulig Monggolchud) reported
the entire situation. Comrade Xu read to them the secret telegram
we had previously sent from Baotou. They all just stared at us
blankly or ruffled through their things and didn’t ask a single
question.
The request for money and rifles was referred to a special commission
chaired by Xu. Afterwards, Borodin and Xu were hardly encouraging;
if the right wing won, they said, even Marshal Feng’s forces would be
cut off from supplies, let alone the Inner Mongols. Xu Qian told them
that even in Guangdong, the authorities were frightened of the feng or
"wind" of the Wuhan government.
Sainbayar tried to send a telegram to the PRPIM’s Central
Committee, but (as usual) it was impossible to tell if it arrived at its
destination. Wuhan and Nanchang continued to negotiate, and until the
future of the Guomindang was decided, neither side had much time for
two "stupid Mongols." Thus they decided Sainbayar would stay behind
to pursue the question of aid, while Oshirov would return north via
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Shanghai. Before he left, Xu Qian managed to dig up 5,000 yuan, of
which 1,000 could be used for Oshirov's travel expenses and 4,000
could be wired by Xu Qian to Erkhimbatu, the PRPIM representative in
Ulaanbaatar.
When he got to Shanghai, Oshirov had far worse news awaiting
him. The embassy in Beijing had received news that off in the north
west, the entire Central Committee of the PRPIM, from Serengdonrub
and Merse on down, had been arrested by Zhang Zuolin’s troops. The
only ray of hope was that one part of the rumors, at least, was obvi
ously false; Oshirov too was said to be among those arrested. Oshirov
thought in his pidgin Chinese: "I too had become meiyou fazi ('no
way')." Clearly, travelling back to Inner Mongolia through Beijing was
out of the question. At the same time he heard that the two factions
had agreed to locate the central government in Wuhan, not Nanchang.
"Chiang Kai-shek had become completely meiyou fazi," and Grigorii
encouraged Oshirov to return to Wuhan to confirm the promise of aid.
Oshirov however was too worried about the Central Committee and
decided to return to Mongolia via the Soviet Union. Thus he sailed
from Shanghai to the Japanese-leased port of Dalian (Dairen) and from
there took the railway to Manzhouli and on to his old home of
Verkhneudinsk, capital of the Buriat-Mongol Republic. Although he
seems to have planned this trip as a temporary interlude, he would not
return to Inner Mongolia again until 1931.
The first news he received in Verkhneudinsk was good. The
Central Committee had only been plundered by bandits nominally
belonging to Marshal Feng's armies. The Inner Mongols were quickly
released and all were safe and sound. The incident luridly illustrated
the disintegration of discipline in the Citizen Armies as they retreated
west, but had done little material harm to the party.
He called
Erkhimbatu, the party's representative in Ulaanbaatar, and found out
that the money had been received from Xu Qian. Happily Oshirov
dictated a letter, dated March 8, 1927, to his friends in the Central
Committee. He told them of the disappointments in the south, the split
in the party, and the confidence among the Soviet advisers that the split
was healed and Chiang Kai-shek had been brought back under party
control. He told them that
Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Xu Qian and many Guomindang com
rades . . .all asked after the health of the comrades in the Central
Committee and especially asked a lot about Serengdonrub and
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Merse. But as I was bu zhidao ("don’t know") in Chinese it was
meiyou fazi ("no way") to remember all these names and I could
just say hao, hao ("good, good") to them.
The leaders of the Chinese Communists had hoped Serengdonrub and
Merse could come to their forthcoming Congress, but as Oshirov noted
"It is another meiyou fazi. A-ya! When will we escape from all these
meiyou fazis, comrades?!" Still, he was still optimistic-he thought the
party ought to make plans for a final campaign against Zhang Zuolin
(just as Chiang's adviser Blucher was doing). Oshirov himself planned
possibly to go to Moscow to make again the plea for money and
weapons.

The Party Split and Oshirov’s Return to Russia
Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov’s return from China came only a
few months after his father's death on October 1, 1926.^^ Aleksandr
had completely broken off any ties with his anti-Bolshevik parents, but
most of the children had stayed on their kulak farm. Only one of
Aleksandr’s older sisters, Antonina, actively associated with the new
regime. She had joined the Youth League and after graduating from
school went to a poor village to work with the people. While Alek
sandr was gone, however, she contracted tuberculosis and died in 1925.
Now that the father of the family was dead, in spring 1927,
Aleksandr visited his old homestead for a few days. The funeral had
just been held as the frozen land thawed, and his sister Ina noticed the
funny impression the soles of his new Chinese shoes made in the muddy
courtyard. To her, Aleksandr gave the advice to work hard and
scientifically "like an American," to be frugal, reuse her clothes, study
hard, and keep clean. The emulation of American science was a slogan
of the New Economic Policy period soon to be abandoned. Alek
sandr's mother and brothers, however, continued to live their prosper
ous way of life, one which would bring disaster on their heads in a few
years.
In May, A.I. Oshirov went to Moscow. There, from May 7 to
May 30, the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Com
munist International was considering the significance of the dramatic
news from China. First, there was the Zhang Zuolin regime's raid on
Information on Oshirov’s personal life in this section again derived
from interviews with his younger sister and ward Ochiryn Namsraijaw.
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the Soviet embassy on April 6. Many Russian and Chinese Guomindang members were arrested; twenty Communists, including Li
Dazhao, were publicly strangled by order of the warlord government.
The second piece of news was Chiang Kai-shek's open break with the
Communists on April 12-14, as gangs under his orders massacred
hundreds of strikers in newly liberated Shanghai. From the night of
April 14, another purge of Communists began in Canton as well. The
question was: Who was meiyou fazi now?—Chiang Kai-shek and the
right wing in Shanghai and Canton or the Left Guomindang-Communist government in Wuhan?
In addition, the policy on the Inner Mongolian revolution was
also discussed. Oshirov was reporting on his mission to the south and
on the request for money and aid. Yet in the few months since he had
left, not only had the situation in China, but also that in the PRPIM, had
undergone disturbing developments. The chairman of the Central
Committee, Serengdonrub, and the secretary were caught up in a furi
ous dispute over the party's ties with Feng’s Citizen Army. At first it
had little to do with the issues animating the split between the right and
the left in the south.
After the retreat Merse blamed the party's
troubles on the alliance with Feng. These allegations angered the local
commander of the Citizen Army and Serengdonrub could only mollify
him by assuring him Merse would be assigned out of Ningxia.^^ On
April 4, 1927, officers in Feng's troops encouraged local Mongol party
members in the central town of nearby Alashan banner to stage a coup
d’etat. With the open backing of the unpopular Citizen Army and car
ried out without the participation of the Central Committee, the seizure
was a political disaster in terms of the party's objectives. The rural
Mongol herdsmen and petty officials, led by a charismatic leader Mao
Baatur, rallied to the defense of the old regime and the banner against
the invading Chinese. Prince Tawangbiirugjal, one of the most conser
vative rulers in Inner Mongolia, suddenly received the strong support
of his people.^^ Merse was angered by the Chinese army's opposition

Nozu Akira ("Yejin Peng"), "Nei Menggu chihua yundong de
bianqian," in Nei Menggu Daxue Zhong-Gong Nei Menggu Diqu Dangshi
Yanjiu Suo, ed., Nei Menggu jindai shi yi cong, 154.
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to the PRPIM extending its activities into Alashan, but Serengdonnib
insisted the party go along. Serengdonnib appeared increasingly
impatient with dissent and entertained visions of a swift and victorious
advance over the steppes when the southern forces reached Inner
Mongolia. Serengdonnib temporarily dismissed Merse from the party
center, and the latter proceeded to Mongolia, intending to call on the
MPRP and the Comintern to back him up in the conflict.^®
Thus the Inner Mongolian party was splitting on its own, just as
the Comintern's Executive Committee was considering how the splits in
the Chinese revolution were to be handled. Unfortunately, the plenum's
documents on Inner Mongolia have not yet been published.^ 1 To judge
from the references to them in the PRPIM documents, the main
decisions, presumably based on Oshirov's oral and Voitinskii's written
report, called for the PRPIM to preserve its alliance with the Left
KMT, but for the first time to treat the Chinese Communists as full
partners in the Inner Mongolian revolution.
Tactics and personnel would be changed and the Central Com
mittee would no longer base itself at Feng's headquarters. The goal of
autonomy would be further clarified to demand an "Autonomous
Republic"; that is. Inner Mongolia would have the same status in China
that Buriatia had in Russia. The program and general aims as set out in
the documents of the First Congress, however, would not be changed.
When the Central Committee presidium members then in Ulaanbaatar
(totaling five of the original seven) on May 31 demanded a Special
Emergency Meeting (iuskhai yaaraltai khurat) and wired their request
to Oshirov in Moscow, the latter replied saying that he would come
with representatives of the Left KMT and the Chinese Communists, as
well as additional Comintern representatives from Moscow.^^
By June 17, however, Moscow wired that Oshirov was sick and
the Comintern would be represented at the Congress by the tough.

ed., Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao, vol. 4 (Khokhekhota, 1964; reprinted, 1979),
1-19, 20-33.
80 MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-18: 13-14, 41-42; 7-1-27:
37-38.
81 Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v dokumentakh: resheniia,
tezisy, ivozvaniia kongressov Kominterna i plenumov IKKl, 1919-1932
(Moscow, 1933), 717-745, records the Eighth Plenum’s resolutions on war,
China, Britain, and Trotsky but nothing on Inner Mongolia.
82 MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-26: 42; 4-1-185: 24, 35.
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leather-jacketed Buriat commissar Matvei Innokent'evich Amagaev.*^
M.I. Amagaev was quite the opposite of Oshirov. Didactic and
self-confident, he was often assigned to brief foreign visitors on the
successes of the Mongolian revolution. Due to his genuine ability, he
generally impressed foreigners, who described him as "a very knowl
edgeable young Buriat Mongol" (Feng Yuxiang), or "spoken of by
everyone as a man of prestige in the Mongolian revolution," "a zealot,"
"who in fact gave me the completest story of the history, growth, and
problems of the National revolution in Mongolia" (Anna Louise
Strong).
Suddenly Oshirov was "off the case." Since he was well
enough to go back to his old job as Commissar of Agriculture in the
Buriat-Mongol government, this dismissal clearly had a political com
ponent. If we look at the criticisms Amagaev made at the PRPIM’s
Special Congress (August 8-September 3, 1927), they concentrated on
the leadership's policy of swift military victories to be won in alliance
with the Citizen Army, and its disdain for building solid bases among
the people in ethnically Mongolian areas. The bungling of the cam
paign in Rehe and the lack of focus in Ordos were advanced as proof of
these opportunistic errors.Yet as we have seen, Oshirov's reports,
written as these errors were taking place, did not warn the Comintern
of them. Oshirov clearly was unable to take on the leadership of the
party and force it in a new direction, and so he was replaced.
Oshirov was safe from any serious political repercussions stem
ming from this implicit rebuke, for he had married Mariia Mikhailovna
Sakh'ianova, an old Buriat associate of M.N. Erbanov, the Chairman of
the Council of People's Commissars of the BMASSR and herself the
First Secretary of the Buriat Mongolian Provincial Party Committee
{pbkorri). Bom in a wealthy Buriat family of eight daughters, she was
given an unusual education for a Buriat woman of that era. She had
been acquainted with both Russian and Buriat revolutionary youth
while at school in Balagansk, after the 1905 Revolution. She went on

MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-26: 43.
Feng Yuxiang, Wo de shenghuo, vol. 2 (Harbin, 1981), 452-3;
Anna Louise Strong, China's Millions (New York, 1928), 357-362, 394.
Rentsensonom, "Owor Mongolyn tiiiikhen amidral” (Oriental and
International Institute Archive: 2-4-4), 51-64.
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to a prestigious finishing school in Petrograd, the Bestuzhev Courses.*^
The effect was presumably otherwise than her parents intended, for by
1917 she had become a staunch Bolshevik. After the October days, she
returned to Irkutsk where in April 1918, she headed the Buriat Sector
of the Central Siberian Bureau until the Czech revolt and the advance
of White forces forced her to flee. Unlike V.I. Trubacheev, M.N.
Erbanov, and others in the small group of Buriat Communists, M.M.
Sakh'ianova spent the Civil War in Moscow, returning to Buriatia at the
end of 1921. From March 1924, she became the First Secretary, and
member of the Presidium of the Buriat Provincial Party Committee.*^
She and A.I. Oshirov must have known each other from 1921,
if not from Irkutsk in 1918. Their backgrounds—Bolshevik children of
wealthy, partially Russified, western Buriat farmer/ranchers-were quite
similar. Both were true believers in the Bolshevik way of life, although
Mariia was both several years older and far more prominent than
Aleksandr. Despite M.M. Sakh'ianova's position, the couple followed
the "commune" movement then current and shared an apartment with
another couple in order to relieve the housing shortage. The squeeze
was increased when, in the fall of 1927, Oshirov took his youngest
sister Ina, then less than ten years old, from their mother to live with
him in Verkhneudinsk. Thus Oshirov saved one member of his family
from the fate that the government he served was preparing for them.
The beginning of collectivization coincided, perhaps not coinci
dentally, with Sakh'ianova and Oshirov's transfer from Verkhneudinsk
to Moscow. Mariia Mikhailovna joined the staff of the Central
Committee, while Aleksandr Ivanovich was to receive a higher educa
tion in the Communist Academy. At the same time collectivization was
wiping out the Oshirov family. In the course of 1929-1930, Alek
sandr’s mother and brothers, hard working Apollon, blue-eyed and
bushy-eyebrowed Filipp, Petr, and Grigorii, the encyclopedia reader,
were exiled without trial to the far North, one after another, for the
crime of being wealthy in a poor country. Only the daughters escaped;
Irina ran away to the north by herself, to Igarka. There she learned the

On this school, see Great Soviet Encyclopedia: A Translation of
the Third Edition, vol. 3 (New York, 1973), under "Bestuzhev Courses" and
"Bestuzhev-Riumin, Konstantin Nikolaevich" (pp. 233, 234). The earlier
name of the school was "The Advanced Courses for Women."
Basaev and Erbanova, M.N. Erbanov, 11, 25, 29, 31, 63, 83;
interview with Ochiryn Namsraijaw.
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local Ewenki language and was eventually brought to Leningrad as a
teacher of the same. Yet the price of escape was the constant fear of
meeting any Buriat who knew her background. Once on a steamer on
the Yenisey she saw her brother Grigorii.
Not wishing to be
recognized she casually sidled up to him and asked "How are you?
Where are you going?" and he replied "Not far, to Turukhansk."
Neither the sons nor their mother survived their exile by long. The
oldest daughter, Radnaa (1900-1979), who had taken a job with a
trading company in Chita may have seemed safer. She had married
Dashi Sampilon, a Buriat official working in the Mongolian People's
Republic.
Yet her husband was disgraced in 1928-9, and was
eventually executed, leaving Radnaa as the widowed mother of two
children.
In Moscow, Aleksandr himself earned no economic advantage
from his position of safety. He and his wife practiced the austere ethics
of the Old Bolsheviks, accepting only the salary that accorded with the
"party maximum" (no higher than a skilled worker's wage).^^ They
lived near the Metropol' hotel in an area fashionable with the
Communist elite and had a dacha, but food and clothes were always in
short supply. They taught their young charge, his sister Ina, not to get
rich or pretty herself Aleksandr and Mariia had little time for her,
being always busy on the tasks of the revolution, but he did arrange for
piano lessons. At the same time the house was a stopping point for
both Buriats and Aleksandr's old associates in China. Grigorii Voitinskii was a frequent guest, as was the Chinese communist Wang Ming.
And Buriats, like the painter Tsyrenzhap Sampilovich Sampilov
(1893-1953), noted for his oil-painting horse portraits, were always
welcome in Aleksandr and Mania's house (despite the couple's
self-imposed poverty).Oshirov's little sister Ina, recalls the New
See Serge Wolff, "Mongol Delegations in Western Europe,
1925-1929," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 32 (1945), 289-298
and 33 (1946), 75-92, especially p. 292, and Plate 1 which shows Radnaa and
Sampilon with their first child, Nima. After Sampilon’s disgrace and execu
tion Radnaa married Byambyn Rinchen, the noted Mongolian scholar (Gyorgy
Kara, personal communication).
The "party maximum" was coming under fire from Stalin at this
period—see Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above,
1928-1941 (New York, 1990), 111-114.
See Sovetskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Moscow, 1983) under
"Sampilov."
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Year’s Day of 1932. Mariia was out working, and Aleksandr had left
on a mission to China. Ina stayed home with a newly arrived Buriat
actor, Khaptagaev, and wife Zoya Piritolchina, daughter of a woman
doctor in Khiakhta. On the table there was nothing—only black bread
and two pieces of dried vobla (Caspian roach fish) so hard that they
had go outside to bang it into pieces. For drink they had only hot
water, yet the guests insisted, "Well, O.K., it’s a fine New Year."
Meanwhile in Inner Mongolia things were going no better with
the PRPIM than with Oshirov's own family. At the Special Congress in
August 1927, Amagaev had not only redirected the party but com
pletely replaced the old Central Committee with youth trained in Mos
cow and Ulaanbaatar. Serengdonrub, Murungga and others were
placed under virtual house arrest. In the beginning of October 1927,
Serengdonrub and several of his associates escaped from Mongolia on
a Citizen Army truck. Returning to the old party headquarters in
Ningxia, he rallied his followers, proclaimed the decisions of the
Special Congress null and void, and denounced the new Central
Committee as puppets of the Soviet Communists. From October on,
two Central Committees—the "old" one in Ningxia and the "new" one
in Ulaanbaatar—competed for the allegiance of rural cells.
In western Inner Mongolia, the old Central Committee domi
nated the area, sending out Sainbayar (who had come back from
Wuhan in summer, 1927) to command all the local Mongol forces. Yet
tensions between party center and the local troops came to a head in
May-June 1928, when Sainbayar tried to order Oljeijirgal's forces back
to Ningxia. Fearing to leave their own banner defenseless, the troops
revolted and drove Sainbayar out. Just after Lunar New Year in
February, 1929, Oljeijirgal was killed by disaffected elements in his own
command.Elsewhere as well, conflicts between party members loyal
to the old and new Central Committees ended in destruction of one or
the other side and, in all cases, demoralization and apathy among the
previously enthusiastic populace. By August 1928, the old Central
Committee of the PRPIM in Ningxia was being dissolved by
Serengdonrub, to be replaced by an Inner Mongolian Party Activities
Steering Committee, subordinate to the Chinese Guomindang central
executive committee. Yet despite the Guomindang conquest of North
China, the Inner Mongolian status quo of despotic government by the
Altan’-orgil, Kdkeqota-yin tetiken monggol surbulji bicig, vol. 3,
Anggi-yin qaricag-a (Qayilar, 1989), 545-6, 548.
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nobility, continued Chinese colonization, and banditry, was not chal
lenged.
Within the "new" faction, dissension also soon broke out. At
the 1927 Special Congress, Amagaev had gotten the support of the
student delegates by endorsing their resentment of Serengdonrub's
sometimes harsh party discipline.
At the same time, though,
Amagaev’s new policy of patient base-building conflicted with the
young students’ demand for immediate and direct support of revolution
in Inner Mongolia. Even before the end of the Special Congress, many
of the members of the old Inner Mongolian Youth Party studying in
Ulaanbaatar, became critical of the slow party-building tactics of the
"New" Central Committee. This group, soon dubbed the "youth
faction," was convinced that with only a small effort promising areas
(like Khdlon Buir) could be detached from Chinese control.
The next year, a group of youth led by Merse began a rebellion
there in August, 1928. Thousands of Khblbn Buir people supported
the rebels, but the Mongol officials of the area, including Erkhimbatu
and other old party members, were alienated by the radical
anti-feudalist line being propagated by the insurgents. Unable to pre
sent a united front to the Chinese authorities, the rebellion was quickly
suppressed, with hundreds of refugees crossing the border into Mon
golia and thousands more being turned back at the frontier line. The
party's numbers and prestige in Kholbn Buir plummeted, while disil
lusioned leaders of the uprising, like Merse, left secret party work to try
to work legally in the new government of China.
From the beginning of 1929 to 1931, the party leadership in
Ulaanbaatar tried to recover from these failures. Instead of rebellions,
they concentrated on propaganda publications and the penetration of
Guomindang cells in Inner Mongolia. Ties with the remaining Ordos
party organizations were maintained precariously and Inner Mongol
students from Moscow and Ulaanbaatar were sent back to link up iso
lated cells. The party’s program turned more radical, reflecting the
collectivization drive in the Soviet Union and the hostile relations
between the USSR and the Republic of China. Now the line called for
alliance with the Communist Party of China and reliance on the
^2 "Nei Meng dangwu baogao," Minguo Ribao (Shanghai), March
30, 1929, 2.
93 MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-18: 50; 7-1-20; 39; 7-1-27:
25-28.
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"genuine poor people" (jingkhini yaduu buurai arad tumen); party
pamphlets promised there would be no more senseless uprisings. The
party’s line on independence-versus-autonomy was finessed with a
concentration on the right of self-determination.
Yet from late 1930 to early 1931, several developments seem to
have convinced the Comintern that a separate ethnic party in Inner
Mongolia was not a viable development. There was only modest suc
cess in expanding the secret party apparatus (and this occurred mostly
in Turned and Chakhar regions). The latter was a predominantly Mon
gol region, but in the Tiimed area, ethnic Chinese dominated both
demographically and culturally and many of those who adapted best to
the new policy of patient underground party-building were Sinicized,
Chinese-speaking Tiimed Mongols.
Independently of the party, Mao Baatur, the popular militia
leader in Alashan who had fought the Citizen Army on behalf of the
legitimate banner prince, began to turn against the conservative gov
ernment and secretly sought support from Mongolia. At the same time,
Mao Baatur was allied with Hui (Chinese-speaking Muslim) rebels in
Ningxia and Qinghai. The party center was very interested in linking
the Uushin party regime with Mao Baatur and the Hui rebels, but the
sectarianism and ethnic exclusiveness of PRPIM seemed to be
preventing such a broad alliance.The Chinese Communists too were
demanding that all revolutionary activists in Inner Mongolia ought to
be brought under the supra-ethnic Chinese Communist Party, just as
had happened in 1929-1930 with the Korean Communists in Northeast
China.
At the same time, civil unrest in Mongolia, stemming from the
government's inflationary and collectivization policy, was reaching a
crisis point. The government was forced to close the border to stop the
flow of refugees and it claimed the public discontent was the result of
Dotogadu Monggol-un edugeki bayidal ba tus rtam-un
jorilg-a-yin tuqai tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig (Dolon Nuur: July 1, 1929),
13-16.
See the 1930 debriefing of Ordos duguilang activists, MPRP Cen
tral Party Archives: 71-18: 61-64, and the late 1929 pamphlet by Temurkuii,
"Obor Monggol-un aq-a degiiii nar-tagan uqagulugsan bicig" in Ediinkesig,
Buyan, Dorungg-a, Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un kodelgegen-u materiyal-un
emkidkel, vol. 1 ("Ordos History" Editorial Committee, 1981), 368.
Chong-sik Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese
Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945 (Berkeley, 1983), 111-126.
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Chinese and Japanese provocateurs.^^ Finally, in January or February
1931, the Mongolian Internal Security Office arrested partisans of the
old "youth faction," accusing them (on very flimsy evidence) of being
Guomindang spies and (with rather more solid evidence) of forming a
secret group aiming to leave Mongolia and pursue revolution outside of
Comintern control. A resulting security survey of Inner Mongols in
Ulaanbaatar found most of them, even the party members, to be disaf
fected and often with suspicious ties to renegades like Serengdonrub or
Merse.^^ Clearly, disaffection in the Inner Mongolian party ranks was
intersecting fatefully with a dramatically heightened sensitivity to pre
sumed security threats in the Mongolian host state.
In this context, the Comintern devised a new policy for Inner
Mongolia in July, 1931. The PRPIM would become subject to a
Northwest Special Committee, under the Chinese Communist Party and
chaired by veteran Chinese Communist Party member Wang Ruofei. In
reality, though, the committee would receive its directives straight from
the Comintern's Executive Committee in Moscow. It would handle all
revolutionary activities in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia,
Shanxi, and
Suiyuan, and would be situated in Ningxia. The Committee's secretary
Wang Ruofei (1896-1946) and Ji He (1905-1983) would go first to
Baotou and establish the eastern center, while a western center would
be established in Ningxia (where liaison could be made between the
Ordos Mongols, Mao Baatur and the Hui rebels). For this western
branch, the Comintern selected Fan Enpu (c. 1898-1970) and A.I.
Oshirov. When the underground Baotou-Ningxia communication route
had been established, Wang and Ji would go west to join Fan and
Oshirov in Ningxia.
Aleksandr Ivanovich began preparing for the mission, sewing
documents into Mongolian robes, and bringing a powerful radio
transmitter, three feet long, home to his apartment. The team left from
Moscow early in September, 1931, and passed through Ulaanbaatar,
Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, 228, 232-3; D. Tserenbaljir, 1932 ony zewsegt boslogo (Ulaanbaatar, 1990).
MPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-73: 1, 8, 137.
Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian," 208; Chen
Zhiling and He Yang, Wang Ruofei zhuan (Shanghai, 1986), 112-119;
Wulanfu Geming Shiliao Bianyanshi, Wulanfu huiyilu, 142-146; Wu
Shusheng and Hao Yufeng, Wulanfu nianpu, vol. 1 (Beijing, 1989), 56-58.
On Ji He, see Qiu Zhizhuo, Zhong-Gong dangshi renming lu (Chongqing,
1986), 80.
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where a Russian, Chernomorduk, was now representing the Comintern.
While there, they received the news of the Japanese seizure of Shen
yang in Northeast China, and the growing danger of war. Documents
issued from the Chinese Communist Party denouncing Japanese impe
rialism were added to their materials. Two Inner Mongols, Badma and
Zhu Shifu, were assigned to escort the western and eastern groups,
respectively, across the border under the cover of being merchants. As
they approached the Mongolian border the two teams switched to
camel caravans. Early PRPIM members had often travelled this route,
but as Mongolia became more secretive and the border guard tighter,
the often-used merchant cover became less convincing. So it proved in
this case.
As Oshirov, Badma, and Fan Enpu were crossing the border
from Mongolia into Inner Mongolia, they were searched by Alashan
banner border guards, the radio transmitter was discovered, and the
group arrested. The Alashan Mongol border troops tied the three up
and interrogated them in the station but they refused to talk. The
agents were then left outside, trussed up in the cold desert night.
Despite their severe frostbite they still refused to divulge the object of
their mission. Fan Enpu, however, wimpering and coughing blood, was
clearly on the verge of breaking. The border troops sent the men along
to the center of Alashan banner where they were interrogated in the
presence of the banner rulers. Each was beaten thirty times with a club
to soften them up. The next time. Fan (who appeared to be the
weakest) was brought in alone. The mere threat of further beatings
induced him to confess the entire story, including the real identities of
Wang Ruofei and the secret communications with Mao Baatur. Fan
was released for his cooperation, but Oshirov, who had resisted torture
to the end, was executed. 1^0

Conclusion
Despite the loss of the western team, Wang Ruofei did reach
Baotou. There he linked up with the Turned Mongolian underground
and prepared the reorientation of party work away from Mongol
On the execution of Oshirov, see Hao Weimin, "Di yi, erci guonei
geming zhanzheng shiqi de Nei Menggu Renmin Geming Dang," in Zhongguo
Menggu Shi Xuehui chengli dahui jinian jikan, 602 and also A. Doak
Barnett, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover (New York, 1963),
211. The date in Barnett is erroneously given as 1934.

88

Christopher A twood

nationalism and secession and towards a United Front against Japan.
On November 22, he too was arrested on the strength of Fan's accusa
tion. Yet the change in approach was accepted among the Tiimed
Mongols and the PRPIM underground located there was rapidly put
under direct Comintern supervision. It seems the Uiishin Banner party
committee did not accept the change and its separatist regime survived
in isolation until 1935, when the Chinese government finally exerted the
effort to get rid of it. Mao Baatur, also on the strength of Fan's
confession, was arrested and sentenced to one year. After his release
he went to Ningxia to serve under the military governor there.
In Mongolia, the PRPIM Central Committee survived for a few
more years. From the moment of the Japanese invasion of Northeast
China, though, the struggle of the Inner Mongolian people for freedom
from Chinese warlord oppression, a fixture of Mongolian propaganda
from 1925 on, vanished, never to return. Instead, the line was changed
to be all the people of China fighting together against Japanese impe
rialism. Nor did the security services relent, fingering yet more impa
tient young students as continuers of the earlier deviations.
The
date is obscure, but perhaps in September, 1933, the PRPIM Central
Committee was formally abolished by the Communist International.
Most of the remaining members in Mongolia stayed there—in any case
they would not be allowed to leave—and perished in Stalin’s hecatombs
of 1937-1939.
A.I. Oshirov's life thus spanned almost the complete course of
the first People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia.
He was
101 mPRP Central Party Archives: 7-1-73: 1-12, especially 2, 8.
102 Wulanfu’s memoirs say the Central Committee was abolished by
the Mongolian People’s Republic in about 1933 (Wulanfli Geming Shiliao
Bianyanshi, Wulanfu huiyi lu, 74). Later he mentions receiving a Comintern
directive in September stating that "considering the attack of Japanese impe
rialism in Chakhar, a new situation has appeared in the nationality struggle in
the Inner Mongolia region." The new situation demanded a concentration on
getting conservative Mongol nationalist. Prince Demchugdongrub, to resist
Japan (pp. 157-8). Probably these two references are different sides of the
same coin.
103 ^ group of PRPIM members in eastern Inner Mongolia preserved
the party’s Eastern Branch underground until 1945 when it reappeared and
played a major role in the ensuing revolutionary transformation of Inner
Mongolia—see Christopher Atwood, "The East Mongolian Revolution and
Chinese Communism," Mongolian Studies 15 (1992), 7-83.
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intimately involved in its unification and expansion in the summer of
1925 in Beijing, and six years later was carrying out orders for its de
facto replacement when he was executed. He and his wife were sincere
believers in the Communist ideal and sacrificed virtually their whole
private lives for it. His young sister, Ina, who lived with him from 1927
to 1931, remembers above all the couple’s revolutionary "pathos."
From the time Oshirov joined the revolution in 1920, he broke
off all ties with his wealthy family, doing nothing to save it from
destruction in the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class." His friends in
Moscow were revolutionary comrades like Voitinskii, Voitinskii’s
consumptive wife Mariia Kuznetsova, and Wang Ming.
^s Alek
sandr passed through Ulaanbaatar on the way back to Inner Mongolia,
his sister Radnaa caught a glimpse of him there in the distance, but he
never once came to see her. News of his death was not received until
two years later, when Grigorii Voitinskii informed M.M. Sakh’ianova
and his sister. Aleksandr Oshirov left no children, nor did his wife
remarry. When decades later his sister Ina tried to find the old Oshirov
home there was nothing left, not even the Oshirovs' home village of
Togot itself The only remains were the grave of Ivan Anatol'evich,
buried in the woods.
Yet as his reports show, Oshirov was no zealous dogmatist.
Among his comrades, he seemed cheerful and humorous, but perhaps
not a very impressive fellow. He lacked the self-confidence and
learning that impressed foreign visitors in Amagaev. His career shows
that the Comintern agents did not have any automatic authority which
made their wishes, or those of their superiors, commands for the local
parties. The authority that Borodin and others had in China was a
result of the wealth of experience they had in running a revolutionary
party. As it turned out, a good deal of that experience was useless or
harmful under the conditions of Asia, but the record also shows that the
native revolutionaries were no less fallible if not more so.^®^ The

Kuznetsova’s strong impression on a group of Chinese working
women is recorded in Vishnyakova-Akimova, Two Years in Revolutionary
China, 288-9. Ina Oshirova was also profoundly affected by her soulfulness
and maternal solicitude.
In his discussion of the 1927 Canton uprising, often considered
the most egregious of the Comintern’s mistakes, Nie Rongzhen strongly criti
cizes the agent on the spot, Heinz Neumann. Yet at the same time, Nie freely
admits that the rebellion was not necessarily a bad idea—and that it was
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history of the Inner Mongolian party has been hitherto virtually totally
ignored but it has also been spared the retrospective glorification of
whoever clawed his way to the top to become the glorious Leader. As
it appears in the documents, the native leaders Serengdonrub, Merse, or
Oljeijargal were not infallible guides thwarted by blundering foreigners
incapable of seeing the obvious, but people who, just like Oshirov,
Amagaev and the other Comintern advisers, were learning as they went
along, and were battling-more often than not unsuccessfiilly--their own
prejudices and errors.

botched by inexperience all down the line. See his Inside the Red Star: The
Memoirs ofMarshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing, 1988), 66-73, 76-79.
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(Left to right) A.I. Oshirov, Vsevolod I. Pudovkin (director), and Valeri
Inkizhinov (lead actor), while filming Potomak Chingis-khana (English
version: "Storm Over Asia"), 1928.
Director V.I. Pudovkin shot much of this film on location in Buriatia. While
there, he relied on Oshirov to supply authentic details of Mongolian life. The
film's initial sequence, for example, showing guests arriving at the
protagonist's yurt was filmed exactly as Oshirov directed. (Jay Leyda, Kino:
A History of the Russian and Soviet Film (New York, 1960: 248-9). Oshirov
got much of his knowledge of old Mongol customs and partisan warfare from
his experience in Inner Mongolia.
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A.I. Oshirov in Moscow shortly before leaving for his last trip to Inner
Mongolia (1931).
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Buriatia, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia in 1925
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